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THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL
RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS
Stephanie H. Barclay*
The Supreme Court has recently expressed a renewed interest in the question of when the Free
Exercise Clause requires exemptions from generally applicable laws. While scholars have vigorously debated what the historical evidence has to say about this question, the conventional wisdom holds that judicially created exemptions would have been a new or extraordinary means of
protecting religious exercise—a sea change in the American approach to judicial review when
compared to the English common law.
This Article, however, questions that assumption and looks at this question from a broader
perspective. When one views judicial decisions through the lens of equitable interpretation, one
finds historical evidence of widespread judicially created exemptions that have been hiding in
plain sight. Indeed, the judiciary’s ability to modify statutes to cohere with higher law principles
like constitutional rights was widely accepted in the early republic. Though the judiciary did not
always use modern language of exemptions, this was functionally what judges were doing on a
large scale throughout the country and across a host of personal rights. The mode of analysis
courts used to create these equitable exemptions also provides an important historical antecedent
for modern strict scrutiny analysis.
An understanding of wider historical judicial practices helps avoid the trend of treating free
exercise judicial remedies as an island in the law, and it also provides additional support for an
original understanding in favor of religious exemptions. Thus, contrary to the conventional
view, this Article demonstrates that judicially created religious exemptions are well within our
constitutional traditions of judicial review, and may have more historical support than the
Court’s current approach.
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purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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INTRODUCTION
Religious exemptions have become controversial—and that’s putting it
mildly. Within the last year, four Justices on the Supreme Court signaled
their interest in revisiting whether the Free Exercise Clause requires judges
to provide religious exemptions from generally applicable laws.1 And in a
case the Court will hear this term, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, one of the
questions presented specifically raises this question.2 Reconsidering whether
the First Amendment requires religious exemptions would involve evaluating
whether Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Employment Division v. Smith
should remain good law.3 Some scholars and jurists alike have sharply criticized Smith for eviscerating free exercise protections.4 On the other hand,
Smith has its defenders.5 Some of these defenders argue, fairly, that revisiting
1 See Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S.Ct. 634, 637 (2019) (Alito, J., joined by
Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ., concurring in denial of certiorari) (discussing the
possibility of revisiting Employment Division v. Smith).
2 See, e.g., Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, SCOTUSBLOG, https://
www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/fulton-v-city-of-philadelphia-pennsylvania/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2020) (noting that cert was granted Feb. 24, 2020); see also Ricks v. Idaho Contractors Board, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/ricks-v-idahocontractors-board/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2020) (noting that there is a pending cert petition
that also raises this question).
3 Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
4 See, e.g., Horvath v. City of Leander, 946 F.3d 787, 794 (5th Cir. 2020) (Ho, J., concurring) (“Smith [is] ‘the Dred Scott of First Amendment law.’” (quoting The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing on S. 2969 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong.
171 (1992) (statement of Nadine Strossen, President, American Civil Liberties Union); and
quoting id. at 42 (statement of Oliver S. Thomas on behalf of the Baptist Joint Committee,
the American Jewish Committee, and the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion))); see
also Garrett Epps, Elegy for a Hero of Religious Freedom, ATLANTIC (Dec. 9, 2014), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/elegy-for-an-american-hero-al-smith-smithemployment-division-supreme-court/383582/. For scholars critiquing Smith, see JOHN
WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT
138 (3d ed. 2011) (describing Smith as a “travesty”); Marc O. DeGirolami, Free Exercise by
Moonlight, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 105, 106 (2016) (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 890) (“Smith’s
approach to free exercise continues to control for constitutional purposes and is, for more
general political purposes, more entrenched than ever. Its admonition about fabulously
remote threats of anarchy in a world where each ‘conscience is a law unto itself’ has ironically become more apt as a warning against the multiplying number of secular interests
argued to be legally cognizable than against religious accommodation run amok.”); W.
Cole Durham, Jr. & Alexander Dushku, Traditionalism, Secularism, and the Transformative
Dimension of Religious Institutions, 1993 BYU L. REV. 421, 448; Kent Greenawalt, Religion and
the Rehnquist Court, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 157 (2004) (arguing that Smith “eviscerated” the
Free Exercise Clause); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1,
1 (“Smith produced widespread disbelief and outrage.”).
5 See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, The Political (and Other) Safeguards of Religious Freedom,
32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1815, 1820–21 (2011) (“Smith affirms not the irrelevance or the dangers of religious freedom, but instead what my colleague Professor Kelley has called the
relative primacy of political actors in the accommodation of religion. . . . [I]t is about
institutional competence, comparative advantage, federalism, and the limits of judicial
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this issue raises important questions about whether judicially crafted exemptions can be justified as a historical matter, particularly with a Supreme Court
increasingly focused on grounding constitutional interpretation in
originalism.6
Much has been written about what the historical evidence tells us regarding the scope of free exercise rights. And a key aspect of this debate has
focused on what role, if any, the judiciary would have been understood to
play in protecting these rights. Philip Hamburger has argued that there is
insufficient historical support for the idea that free exercise protections
included the ability of judges to craft exemptions from generally applicable
laws.7 Hamburger argues that the lack of evidence of judicial religious
exemptions underscores the fact that the scope of religious exercise rights
only included the ability to be free from overt religious government discrimination or persecution based on religion.8 And Hamburger claims it is
“improbable” that the Founding generation would have contemplated a judiciary with the power to craft exemptions.9 Justice Scalia cited to
Hamburger’s work in support of his conclusion that judicially created religious exemptions are not historically justified.10
In contrast to Hamburger and Scalia, Michael McConnell argues that
the most influential Founding-era theory of religious liberty was that it flowed
review. These considerations should not be regarded as unwelcome or hostile interlopers
in the religious liberty conversation.” (citing William K. Kelley, The Primacy of Political Actors
in Accommodation of Religion, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 403 (2000))); Philip A. Hamburger, A
Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
915, 916 (1992) (questioning the originalist historical evidence in favor of religious exemptions); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 308, 309 (1991) (defending “Smith’s rejection of constitutionally compelled free exercise exemptions without defending Smith itself”); Matthew J. Franck, Professor Paulsen and
Justice Scalia: A Qualified Defense of the Smith Decision, PUB. DISCOURSE (Jun. 17, 2015),
https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2015/06/15047/ (“[I]t is hard to credit the idea
that the founding generation envisioned such an enlarged role for the judiciary as the
exemptions approach requires.”); Vincent Phillip Muñoz, Muñoz: Justice Scalia was Right
About Religious Free Exercise, L. & RELIGION F. (Sept. 6 2016), https://lawandreligion
forum.org/2016/09/06/munoz-justice-scalia-was-right-about-religious-free-exercise/
(emphasis omitted) (“Justice Scalia’s non-exemptionist reading of the Free Exercise Clause
is the only construction consistent with the American founders’ natural rights political
philosophy and their attendant social compact constitutionalism.”).
6 See, e.g., McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 676 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
denial of certiorari) (emphasizing the importance of grounding First Amendment jurisprudence in history).
7 See Hamburger, supra note 5, at 916 (questioning the originalist historical evidence
in favor of religious exemptions); see also Marshall, supra note 5, at 309 (defending “Smith’s
rejection of constitutionally compelled free exercise exemptions without defending Smith
itself”).
8 See Hamburger, supra note 5, at 916–17.
9 Id. at 931–32.
10 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 540 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
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from religious duty, which trumps the claims of civil society.11 As a result,
religious exercise included the right to engage in religious conduct even
when that conduct incidentally conflicts with general legal requirements (so
long as that conduct did not endanger public health or safety).12 Regarding
judicially created exemptions to protect this right, McConnell asserts that
“the advent of judicial review had transformed a principle of free exercise
previously enforced solely through legislative action into one enforceable
through the courts.”13 McConnell points to this empowerment of the judiciary in support of his important argument that religious exercise was not limited to freedom from religious discrimination.14
Gerard Bradley, by contrast, disagrees that such a change regarding the
judiciary occurred, and argues that if it had, “the abrupt turn would have left
a measurable historical path.”15 Bradley also argues that McConnell and
other proponents of religious exemptions fundamentally misunderstand
judicial review, and that creating any sort of exemptions for conduct was an
invention from the late twentieth century.16
While these scholars and jurists disagree about what the evidence shows,
they seem to agree that it would have been a new or extraordinary role for
the judiciary to protect religious exercise by exempting conduct from laws—a
sea change in the law.17 Such a position logically places a heavier burden on
proponents of religious exemptions to demonstrate that the United States, in
fact, departed from the English judicial practices and empowered American
jurists to take on a new powers. And a failure to demonstrate this judicial
departure in the context of religious exercise would provide additional evidence for the idea that religious exercise did not include the ability to
engage in religious conduct contrary to general laws. But is that understanding correct?
This Article challenges the conventional wisdom that the judicial practice of exempting conduct from statutes was either new or extraordinary.
11 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1414–15, 1511–13 (1990).
12 Id.
13 Id. at 1510.
14 Douglas Laycock has made similar arguments to McConnell. See Douglas Laycock,
The Supreme Court’s Assault on Free Exercise, and the Amicus Brief That Was Never Filed, 8 J.L. &
RELIGION 99 (1990). In a similar vein, John Eastman has pointed to the record of the First
Congress, arguing that Congress’s deliberation over a proposed conscription exemption in
the Bill of Rights, and its discussion of William Penn’s imprisonment for refusing to
remove his hat in court, demonstrates “that the Founders recognized, as part of their legal
landscape, broad accommodation of religion.” Brief for Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia (No. 19123). See also John Yoo & James C. Phillips, More on the Free-Exercise Clause and Religious
Exemptions, NAT’L REV. (Dec. 12, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/
12/constitution-free-exercise-of-religion-clause-exemptions/ (making similar arguments).
15 Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20
HOFSTRA L. REV. 245, 267, 271–72 (1991).
16 See id. at 271–72.
17 See id.
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Just the opposite, this Article shows that under a widely accepted doctrine
called equity of the statute, judicially created exemptions were frequently
employed during the Founding period to protect a wide variety of liberties
from laws that swept too broadly.18
As described perhaps first by Aristotle, “laws, being in their nature general, cannot decide rightly in the infinite variety of particular cases.”19 Thus,
“[w]hen an exception to the rule occurs . . . this exception is admitted in equity,
which thus supplies the defect of law.”20 Under this doctrine of the equity of

18 To be sure, the Founding period is not the only relevant time period for understanding the Free Exercise Clause. For an excellent discussion of the history relevant to
the Free Exercise Clause during the Reconstruction Period, see Kurt T. Lash, The Second
Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 NW.
U. L. REV. 1106 (1994).
19 1 HENRY WILLIAM DESAUSSURE, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE
COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF SOUTH-CAROLINA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO DECEMBER, 1813, INCLUSIVE xxxii (Columbia, Cline & Hines 1817) (quoting ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS AND POLITICS, bk. V, ch. 10 (John Gillies, trans., London 1797) (c. 384
B.C.E.)).
20 Id. (emphasis added); see also ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA bk V, at 1137b (W.D.
Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1925) (c. 384 B.C.E.) (“When the law speaks universally,
then, and a case arises on it which is not covered by the universal statement, then it is right,
where the legislator fails us and has erred by over-simplicity, to correct the omission—to
say what the legislator himself would have said had he been present, and would have put
into his law if he had known. . . . And this is the nature of equitable, a correction of law
where it is defective owing to its universality.”). Some scholars have debated whether
Roman law had some influence on this doctrine. See THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON
THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 296 (New York, John S. Voorhies 1857); Hans W. Baade, The Casus Omissus: A Pre-History of Statutory Analogy, 20 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 45, 65–69 (1994)
(footnotes omitted) (“In Roman law, we saw, the ground rules of statutory interpretation
changed profoundly with the transition from a representative republic to an increasingly
autocratic empire, and a similar dichotomy developed (almost simultaneously, this time)
between the ius commune and canon law in the Renaissance. It stands to reason that
English lawyers (including English common lawyers) drew upon the civil or canon law
model of statutory interpretation most congenial to their respective eras as well as their
constitutional preferences.”); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 30 (2001) (citing 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 (San Francisco, A.L. Bancroft 1881)) (Pomeroy argued that equity was “borrowed” by English chancellors “from the
acquitas and judicial powers of the Roman magistrates”); Frederick J. deSloovère, The
Equity and Reason of a Statute, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 591, 593 (1936) (“Equitable interpretation
seems therefore to have evolved in England in part from the doctrine of interpretation by
voluntas of the Roman law, in part from the doctrine that positive legislation was conceived
to be declaratory of natural-law principles demanding an extension of statutory precepts to
accord with the interpreter’s own ideas, or those objectively established, as to natural rights
and justice, in part from the civil-law doctrine that treats a statute as a principle, and in part
from the influence of the equity courts with respect to poorly drawn and inadequate statutes of the time.”).
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the statute,21 English courts regularly created exemptions to statutes, dating
potentially as early as the fourteenth century in England.22 As Blackstone
explained, these courts relied on equity principles to “except[ ] those circumstances” from legislation to avoid results that infringed on a host of personal
liberties and common-law norms.23 Like Aristotle, Blackstone referred to
“equity,” as a judicial “method of interpreting laws” that involved “correction”
where the “law (by reason of its universality) is deficient.”24 This statutory
interpretation method should not be confused with remedies specific to
courts of equity, as opposed to courts of law. As John Manning explained,
“while the modern lawyer equates the term ‘equity’ with the extraordinary
relief dispensed by the chancellor, the doctrine of the equity of the statute
also had a life of its own in the run-of-the-mill statutory decisions rendered by
the law courts.”25 This interpretation method was the norm understood by
leading English and American jurists leading up to and immediately following the American Revolution.26
An understanding of these wider judicial practices helps avoid the trend
of treating free exercise judicial remedies as an island in the law. Indeed,
some of our country’s earliest cases granting religious exemptions reflect an
understanding of religious exemptions growing out of this background equitable interpretation norm.27 One could argue that it would have been an
“abrupt turn” in the law to place a unique bar on the judiciary’s equitable
ability to protect just one type of individual right—religious exercise. And if
judicially created exemptions would not have been an anomalous means of
protecting religious rights, then opponents of religious exemptions cannot
rely on that historical argument—the unprecedented nature of judicial
exemptions—as evidence that religious exercise was understood narrowly as
only a prohibition on legislative discrimination.
An understanding of broader juridical norms regarding equitable interpretation also has important implications for assessing whether the Court’s
21 See Manning, supra note 20, at 31; S.E. Thorne, The Equity of a Statute and Heydon’s
Case, 31 ILL. L. REV. 202, 204 (1936).
22 See infra Section II.B.
23 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *61 (emphasis added); see William N.
Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1012 (2001) (“The reasoning in the reported
decisions [surrounding the Founding period] reveals that judges considered statutory
goals. . . , the common law, natural law and common sense, and constitutional values relevant to the application of statutes; the results in the cases demonstrate that judges were
often willing to bend or break the letter of the law to accommodate norms and
practices.”).
24 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *61.
25 Manning, supra note 20, at 30 (citing HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE
CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS § 28, at 57 (2d ed. 1911)); see also 1 JAMES
WILSON, THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON, L.L.D. 261 (Philadelphia, Bird
Wilson 1804) (explaining that when courts used the method of equitable interpretation,
“we find no difference between a court of law and a court of equity”).
26 See infra Sections II.B–C.
27 See infra Sections III.A–B.
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reasoning in Smith is justified as a historical matter. In Smith, Scalia argued
that religious exemptions would be a “constitutional anomaly,”28 that neutral
and generally applicable statutes were entitled to deference (rather than
scrutiny) from the judiciary,29 and that providing exemptions would undercut rule-of-law norms and create a system that was “courting anarchy.”30 To
the contrary, this Article demonstrates that equitable exemptions to statutes
were a judicial norm, not an anomaly.31 Broad, generally applicable laws
were often treated with suspicion, not deference.32 And providing exemptions to laws was understood as more respectful to rule-of-law norms than
declaring a law void.33 Thus, some of the fundamental assumptions on
which the Court relied in Smith do not find support in the relevant historical
evidence.
Admittedly, the fact that Smith relies on assumptions without basis in
history does not go the full distance of establishing that religious exemptions
are supported by history. Indeed, even some defenders of Smith acknowledge
that the case relies on faulty analysis for a number of reasons.34 While a full
treatment of all the relevant historical evidence is beyond the scope of this
Article, understanding the role equitable interpretation plays in judicial
exemptions provides potential additional historical support for a modern
religious exemption framework.
Specifically, the mischief rule was a form of equitable interpretation that
focused on the problem the legislature was trying to solve when it crafted the
law.35 Courts would exempt applications of laws that did not actually help
the government address the mischief at issue. This sort of analysis is similar
to that used by early antebellum courts providing religious exemptions, when
they determined that exempting religious objectors would not actually
undercut government interests in peace and safety. Indeed, it is plausible
that the mischief rule would have frequently justified lower court decisions to
decline to apply laws to religious objectors. Notably, this mischief analysis
resembles modern strict scrutiny analysis in certain respects, particularly
under the portion of the test that looks at whether application of a law to a
28 Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 & n.3 (1990).
29 See id. at 885–86 (emphasizing the need to protect “[t]he government’s ability to
enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct”); see id. at 878 (“[I]f
prohibiting the exercise of religion (or burdening the activity of printing) is not the object
of the tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid
provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.”). For a subsequent important
exception to this holding, see Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190 (2012).
30 Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.
31 See infra Section III.A.
32 See infra Section III.B.
33 See infra Section III.A.
34 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 15, at 247 (“I propose to defend Smith’s abandonment
of Sherbert, though not all of its reasons for so doing.”).
35 See infra Section III.B.
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specific scenario would actually advance the government’s interest.36 This
argument contradicts the position asserted by some jurists and scholars that
the “compelling interest test” used in a religious exemption regime simply
has no basis in history.37
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background on religious exemption cases, along with the relevant scholarly debate regarding
what we should make of these cases. Part II addresses the critique that there
is little evidence of judicially created exemptions at the Founding period,
explaining both why that is the case and pushing back on the conventional
wisdom about which default norms should govern in the face of a lack of
historical precedent. Part II then traces the historical origins of judicially
created exemptions to statutes and explains how equitable judicial review
norms gained further legitimacy in the American context of constitutional
restraints on the legislature. This Part concludes with a brief overview of how
equitable interpretation may have evolved over time into, among other
things, the modern constitutional doctrine of as-applied challenges. Part III
situates our earliest American judicial exemption conflicts in the broader
lens of this judicial review context and explores the implications of viewing
these cases, as well as the Smith decision, through the broader lens of equitable interpretation. Part III also describes how the mischief rule operates as a
historical antecedent of aspects of modern strict scrutiny analysis. Part IV
addresses potential counterarguments and identifies areas where further
research is warranted.
I. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief Sketch of Religious Exemption Cases
Through the early republic until 1813, there are no published cases in
which the judiciary addressed a religious exemption question.38 The first
36 See infra Section II.B; see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) (explaining that strict scrutiny requires the government
to prove its interest is “compelling” and its law is “narrowly tailored to advance that interest”); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431
(2006) (explaining that the compelling interest standard requires courts to “look[ ]
beyond broadly formulated interests” and instead “scrutinize[ ] the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants”).
37 See infra Section III.A.
38 McConnell, supra note 11, at 1504 (stating Phillips is “[t]he earliest state court decision expressly addressing the exemption question”). Justice Scalia has argued that the first
religious exemption case was Stansbury v. Marks, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 213, 1 L. Ed. 353 (Pa.
1793), “decided just two years after the ratification of the Bill of Rights.” City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 543 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part). This case reads in its
entirety as follows:
In this cause (which was tried on Saturday, the 5th of April) the defendant
offered Jonas Phillips, a Jew, as a witness; but he refused to be sworn, because it
was his Sabbath. The Court, therefore, fined him £10; but the defendant, afterwards, waving the benefit of his testimony, he was discharged from the fine.
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applicable case in 1813 is People v. Phillips,39 which dealt with whether New
York could subpoena a Catholic priest and force him to testify (or face punishment for refusing) about a confession the priest had received about stolen
jewelry. We only have record of this case because the attorney who represented the priest circulated his shorthand transcript of the proceedings. The
court ruled for the Catholic priest, arguing that under both the common law
and New York’s constitution the priest was entitled to a religious exemption
from the rule requiring testimony.40 Commonwealth v. Cronin in 185641 is
another early case coming out of Virginia with facts and a holding very similar to People v. Phillips. Both cases shed light on how judges at the time dealt
with the lack of recorded decisions specifically allowing judicial religious
exemptions, and the default norms that filled in the gaps in such an instance.
Other exemption cases that came after People v. Phillips were not necessarily uniform in their approach. As Professors McConnell, Garvey, and Berg
observed, five states decided religious exemption cases.42 One state—Massachusetts—provided no clear basis for its decision.43 Two states required
exemptions (New York and Virginia),44 and two states rejected religious
exemptions (Pennsylvania and South Carolina).45 However, though PennStansbury, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 213. It is unclear from this decision if the witness specifically
requested a religious exemption, and even if so, why the court denied it. Id.
39 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. June 14, 1813). This case was not officially reported, but a
record of the arguments and the court’s ruling are found in WILLIAM SAMPSON, THE CATHOLIC QUESTION IN AMERICA (photo. reprint. 1974) (1813).
40 SAMPSON, supra note 39, at 103.
41 Commonwealth v. Cronin, 1 Q.L.J. 128, 128 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1856).
42 MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY & THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION AND THE
CONSTITUTION 131 (1st ed. 2002).
43 See generally Commonwealth v. Drake, 15 Mass. (14 Tyng) 161 (Mass. 1818) (The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts refused to overturn a criminal conviction based
on a confession made by a man to the members of his church but provided no explanation
for this ruling. Attorneys for the prosecution argued that the confession had been voluntary and not required by religious belief, and thus implicitly that this was not a freedom of
conscience issue.).
44 See SAMPSON, supra note 39, at 103; Cronin, 1 Q. L.J. at 128.
45 Philips v. Gratz (Simon’s Executors), 2 Pen. & W. 412, 416–17 (Pa. 1831) (“The
religious scruples of persons concerned with the administration of justice will receive all
the indulgence that is compatible with the business of government; and had circumstances
permitted it, this cause would not have been ordered for trial on the Jewish Sabbath. But
when a continuance for conscience’ sake is claimed as a right, and at the expense of a
term’s delay, the matter assumes a different aspect. . . . [C]onsiderations of policy address
themselves with propriety to the legislature, and not to a magistrate, whose course is prescribed, not by discretion, but rules already established.”); State v. Willson, 13 S.C.L. (2
McCord) 393, 396 (Const. Ct. 1823) (the court rejected the religious request of religious
individuals to be “excused” from jury duty on account of conscientious objection, but the
court never analyzed South Carolina’s free exercise provision in the constitution). Subsequent courts, outside of the Founding time period, that rejected religious exemptions
seemed to share a fear that religious exemption requests were a zero-sum conflict where
religious objectors must always win and thus receive a “get out of the law free” sort of card,
or where the government must always win so that its interests would not be thwarted. This
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sylvania and South Carolina had appellate decisions rejecting religious
exemptions, there was also evidence in both states of de facto exemptions
just being allowed by trial judges with broad discretion.46 Thus, the evidence
“strongly suggests that the actual practice favored exemptions, even though
the appellate decisions” in these states “went the other way.”47 Furthermore,
Pennsylvania was also one of the states “most hostile to judicial review.”48
McConnell has observed that Chief Judge Gibson penned both Simon’s Executors and Lesher, and in these cases “his rejection of constitutional judicial
review and his position on free exercise exemptions were closely related.”49
In federal court, only one religious exemption case has been found during the pre–Civil War period.50 In that case, the lawyers on both sides
seemed to assume that religious exemptions were a possibility, but the
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not apply to state and
local government actions and did not address the merits.51 Because of the
inapplicability of the First Amendment to state and local action, it was not
until the 1878 case of Reynolds v. United States that the Supreme Court had a
chance to interpret the Free Exercise Clause.52 There, the Court held that
the First Amendment did not prohibit the federal government from prohibiting polygamy in the federal territory that is now Utah.53
mode of thinking increased as the pluralism of religions increased in the mid-1800s. See
generally Wesley J. Campbell, Note, A New Approach to Nineteenth-Century Religious Exemption
Cases, 63 STAN. L. REV. 973, 981 (2011) (describing how judicial skepticism of beliefs
increased as diversity of religious beliefs proliferated).
46 McConnell, supra note 11, at 1511 (citing Commonwealth v. Lesher, 17 Serg. &
Rawle 155 (Pa. 1828)). The dispute arose because a lower court judge excused a juror
from a case who had “conscientious scruples on the subject of capital punishment.” Lesher,
17 Serg. & Rawle at 155. See Willson, 13 S.C.L. (2 McCord) at 395–96 (“There is set forth
among the causes shown, a notice of certain instances of individuals being excused, as well
as an appeal to good feelings, plainly interwoven in the brief. And no doubt, instances
have occurred, and will again occur, where the parties attended at the time required by
law, but there being superfluous jurors, were readily excused.”).
47 McConnell, supra note 11, at 1511.
48 Campbell, supra note 45, at 996.
49 McConnell, supra note 11, at 1507. Gibson also espoused views that directly conflicted with those espoused by Madison in Memorial and Remonstrance. See JAMES MADISON,
MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 48 (John J. Patrick
& Gerald P. Long eds., 1999). McConnell argues that these combined views of Gibson
“provide[ ] further reason to doubt that he represented the prevailing view on the interpretation of free exercise.” McConnell, supra note 11, at 1509.
50 See Permoli v. Mun. No. 1 of New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845).
51 Id.; McConnell, supra note 11, at 1503 (“[I]t is suggestive that counsel for the city
felt it necessary to defend the ordinance under the ‘law of necessity’ in light of its purpose
to prevent the spread of yellow fever. This may indicate that the legal profession believed
that interference with religious activities required compelling justification.” (quoting
Permoli, 44 U.S. at 601)).
52 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
53 Id. at 167.
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In the 1943 case of Murdock v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court declined
to follow the Reynolds approach and instead granted a religious exemption
from an ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation.54 The Court held
that “equality in treatment [did] not save the ordinance,” because
“[f]reedom of press, freedom of speech, [and] freedom of religion are in a
preferred position.”55 The Supreme Court formalized its doctrine for providing religious exemptions in Sherbert v. Verner in 1963.56 Under this strict
scrutiny approach, the government would have to provide a religious exemption when its actions burdened religious exercise, unless the government had
a compelling reason to override the religious belief and could not accomplish that interest in some other less restrictive way.57 In 1972, the Court
affirmed this approach for religious exercise in Wisconsin v. Yoder, where
Amish plaintiffs requested an exemption from mandatory public school
requirements.58 Scholars debate how faithfully the Court adhered to this
approach in the next two decades.59
Then in 1990, the Supreme Court reversed course in Employment Division
v. Smith.60 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia rejected the legal
framework that had presumptively favored religious exemptions. Instead,
Scalia wrote that if a law were neutral and generally applicable, then it was
entitled to deference from the judiciary rather than any form of heightened
scrutiny.61 To justify his decision in Smith, Scalia argued that religious
exemptions would be a “constitutional anomaly,”62 that neutral and generally applicable statutes were entitled to deference from the judiciary,63 and
that providing exemptions would undercut rule of law norms and create a
system that was “courting anarchy.”64 In a subsequent concurring opinion in
City of Boerne, Justice Scalia argued that these assumptions were supported by
the historical record.65
Congress responded swiftly to Smith just years later by passing statutes
such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to reinstate heightened scrutiny in certain contexts.66 But as a matter of constitutional law,
54 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 117 (1943).
55 Id. at 115; see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306–11 (1940).
56 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
57 Id.
58 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
59 See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions,
38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 35, 51–52 (2015).
60 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
61 See id. at 882, 886 n.3.
62 Id. at 886.
63 Id. at 885–86 (emphasizing the need to protect “[t]he government’s ability to
enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct”).
64 Id. at 888.
65 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 542 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
66 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012); Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 210, 243–44 (1994). See generally
Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom
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Smith is currently the law of the land.67 Its days, however, may be numbered.
Within the last year, four Justices on the Supreme Court signaled their interest in revisiting whether Smith should remain good law.68 And the Supreme
Court is hearing a case this fall that presents the question of whether the
Court should overrule this precedent.69
B. Competing Accounts of Historical Support for Religious Exemptions
This Section highlights three leading schools of thought about the historical support for judicially created religious exemptions: Justice Scalia’s
position (closely tracking Hamburger), McConnell’s position, and Bradley’s
position.
Justice Scalia argued that the First Amendment’s text preventing Congress from “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” simply means that
government could not ban “acts or abstentions” if the government did so
“only because of the religious belief that they display.”70 Justice Scalia cited
to Hamburger to argue that early historical evidence suggested the Constitution did not prevent government from restricting “religious freedom” that
resulted in “illegal actions” under generally applicable laws.71 This meant
that religious exercise was basically just a guarantee of “equality or nondiscrimination,” according to Hamburger.72 In other words, religious exercise
could be completely restricted if the law did not discriminate between religRestoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1994). Some states also responded by passing their own
version of RFRA. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, State Religious Freedom Statutes in Private and
Public Education, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531 (1999) (describing situations to which state
RFRAs have been applied); John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the
American Constitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371, 374–75 (1996) (“[S]tate
legislatures and courts have become bolder in conducting their own experiments in religious liberty that seem calculated to revisit, if not rechallenge, prevailing Supreme Court
interpretations of . . . free exercise clauses.”).
67 To be sure, Smith has been limited by cases such as Church Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1990).
68 See Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634, 637 (2019) (Alito, J., joined by
Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ., concurring in denial of certiorari) (discussing the
possibility of revisiting Employment Division v. Smith).
69 See, e.g., Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, SCOTUSBLOG, https://
www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/fulton-v-city-of-philadelphia-pennsylvania/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2020) (noting that cert was granted Feb. 24, 2020); see also Ricks v. Idaho Contractors Board, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/ricks-v-idahocontractors-board/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2020) (noting that there is a pending cert petition
that also raises this question).
70 Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (alteration in original) (emphasis
added).
71 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 540 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part)
(quoting Hamburger, supra note 5, at 919).
72 Hamburger, supra note 5, at 919.
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ious and nonreligious conduct—a “general law[ ] governing conduct.”73 If
the opposite were true, Scalia argued this would create “a private right to
ignore generally applicable laws,” which would be “a constitutional anomaly.”74 Scalia underscored the anomalous nature of this sort of religious
exemption by pointing to the lack of Founding-era examples of judicially
created religious exemptions.75 Relying in part on this historical evidence,
Scalia (like Hamburger) argued that the scope of religious exercise rights
only included the ability to be free from overt religious government discrimination or persecution based on religion.76
In contrast, McConnell argues that “constitutionally compelled exemptions [from generally applicable laws regulating conduct] were within the
contemplation of the framers and ratifiers” as a possible meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause.77 McConnell goes on to say that “the advent of judicial
review had transformed a principle of free exercise previously enforced solely
through legislative action into one enforceable through the courts,”78 and
that “[o]nce the people empowered the courts to enforce the boundary
between individual rights and the magistrate’s power, they entrusted the
courts with a responsibility that prior to 1789 had been exercised only by the
legislature.”79 Thus, by using this revolutionary power of judicial review,
courts would now be able to play a more active role in the fate of
legislation.80
Bradley, by contrast, disagrees that such a change involving the courts
occurred, and argues that if it had, “the abrupt turn would have left a measurable historical path.”81 Bradley also takes the argument a step further
than Scalia and Hamburger. He argues that McConnell and other propo73 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 539 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (emphasis omitted).
Hamburger also pointed to the text of the First Amendment in support of this
interpretation:
This assumption is apparent in the language of the First Amendment, which
begins, “Congress shall make no law.” Rather than suppose that civil laws will in
some respects prohibit the free exercise of religion and that exemptions will be
necessary, the First Amendment assumes Congress can avoid enacting laws that
prohibit free exercise.
Hamburger, supra note 5, at 937–38 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).
74 Smith, 494 U.S. at 886.
75 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 542–43 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (“[I]t
would be surprising not to find a single state or federal case refusing to enforce a generally
applicable statute because of its failure to make accommodation. Yet the dissent cites
none—and to my knowledge, and to the knowledge of the academic defenders of the
dissent’s position, none exists.” (citation omitted)).
76 Id. at 539, 542–44 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (“The historical evidence . . . is
more supportive of th[e] conclusion [in Smith] than destructive of it.”); see Hamburger,
supra note 5, at 916–17.
77 McConnell, supra note 11, at 1415.
78 Id. at 1510.
79 Id. at 1445.
80 See id.
81 Bradley, supra note 15, at 267.
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nents of religious exemptions misunderstand judicial review during the
Founding period. Judicial review in the early republic did not include creating exemptions from laws based on conduct.82 Rather, “judicial review” at
the Founding simply meant declaring that “a law was ‘null’ and ‘void,’ ” akin
to a “plain error” rule that “courts might void legislative action only when it
was clearly, undeniably contrary to the obvious meaning of the constitutional
text.”83 He thus asserts that judicially created statutory exemptions are a latecoming invention from “the late twentieth century”84 and are simply “one
aspect of the post–World War II takeover of our civil liberties corpus by political morality of liberal individualism.”85 Judicially created religious exemptions are, under this account, simply part of this activist liberal individualism,
with no real basis in history.86
II. RETHINKING

THE

HISTORICAL ORIGINS

OF

RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS

Bradley’s argument highlights an important truth: the historical story of
religious exemptions is simply part of a larger story about judicial review and
early constitutional remedies. Leading scholars and jurists disagree about
what the limited historical record has to tell us about judicially created religious exemptions. But they seem to share the conventional wisdom that judicially created exemptions would have been new and significant in the free
exercise context.87 By shifting the perspective to a broader historical lens,
this Part challenges that conventional wisdom. In fact, under the doctrine of
equity of the statute, one finds historical evidence of widespread judicially
created exemptions from statutes that has been hiding in plain sight.
But before turning to the background equitable practices at play, this
Part addresses why the lack of voluminous religious exemption cases should
not be surprising, and in fact underscores the need to inform our analysis
with an understanding of broader judicial review norms.
A. The Limited Historical Record Increases the Need for a Broader Understanding
of Judicial Norms
Justice Scalia, Hamburger, and Bradley have argued that judicially created religious exemptions from statutes are not justified by the historical evidence because there are limited examples at the Founding period.88 It is
82 Id. at 271–72.
83 Id. at 271 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
84 Id. at 272.
85 Id. at 248.
86 In a similar vein, Vincent Muñoz describes the evolution of the judiciary providing
exemptions as “modern moral autonomy exemptionism” and distinguishes this from what
the Founders envisioned. Vincent Phillip Muñoz, If Religious Liberty Does Not Mean Exemptions, What Might It Mean? The Founders’ Constitutionalism of the Inalienable Rights of Religious
Liberty, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1387, 1388 (2016).
87 See supra Section I.B.
88 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 542 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); see
also supra Section I.B.
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true that we do not have a robust record of judicially created religious
exemptions around the Founding period. But close historical analysis of
judicial review norms reveals a number of reasons why this lack of evidence is
unsurprising and may in fact cut against critics of religious exemptions.
One challenge for this theory is that judicial opinions were generally not
published during the Founding period, and published reports were rare even
in the early decades of the republic.89 Gordon Wood has observed that
“[w]ith no printed [colonial] decisions there could be little reliance on local
precedents other than those in memory.”90 It is possible, then, that there are
several judicially created religious exemptions from statutes of which we simply do not have record. With such an incomplete sample, one makes claims
about the significance of lack of such decisions at one’s own peril.91
Moreover, the volume of judicial decisions about constitutional issues
was far lower at the Founding period than the modern judicial constitutional
caseload, and that is especially true of federal courts.92 In his important
recent book surveying the historical development of judicial review of statutes, Keith Whittington observed that “[f]rom the founding through the Civil
War, the Court reviewed laws at a low rate and somewhat sporadically.”93
While judicial enforcement of constitutional limits on statutes was “familiar,”
it was “not exactly common.”94 The Supreme Court, for example, struck
down or invalidated federal statutory provisions “at a rate of less than one
every two years (and state statutes at a slightly higher rate) in the decades
prior to Reconstruction.”95 During this period, it was not uncommon for the
89 William Baude & Jud Campbell, Early American Constitutional History: A Source
Guide 16 (last updated Nov. 2, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://
ssrn.com/abstract=2718777) (“Published reports of American judicial decisions were
unknown at the founding and somewhat rare in the early republic.”); Farah Peterson, Interpretation as Statecraft: Chancellor Kent and the Collaborative Era of American Statutory Interpretation, 77 MD. L. REV. 712, 748 (2018) (“Legal publishing in the first two decades of the
nineteenth century was spotty . . . .”).
90 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 297
(1969).
91 As the old saying goes, the absence of evidence is not necessarily the evidence of
absence.
92 Peterson, supra note 89, at 716 (“There is, I think, very little the early federal reporters can teach us about the ‘original meaning’ of judicial power. . . . [The federal courts’]
jurisdiction was tiny, and what jurisdiction they had was so freighted with non-legal pressure that their decisions provide little helpful data for understanding the development of
statutory interpretation as a legal, rather than diplomatic, activity.”); see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, REPUGNANT LAWS: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ACTS OF CONGRESS FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE
PRESENT 61 (2019) (“The power of judicial review developed gradually during the first half
of the nineteenth century, facilitating the goals of national political actors and consolidating the Court’s claimed ability to define the institutional limits of congressional power.”).
93 WHITTINGTON, supra note 92, at 27.
94 Id.
95 Id.
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Court to go a year without constitutionally limiting any statute.96 Based on
the evidence we have of district courts and circuit courts, which again were
not reliably reported, there is a “similar story” of a low volume of cases evaluating the constitutionality of statutes compared to modern constitutional
caseloads.97
In a similar vein, the volume of statutes passed by legislatures at the
Founding period was much lower than it is now. In fact, “the output of Congress” measured by the number of pages in the Statutes at Large “has far outstripped the judicial review activity of the Supreme Court.”98 With a much
lower number of laws at the Founding period, one would expect a much
lower number of judicial opinions analyzing their constitutionality. And such
a comparison does not include the much more voluminous amount of executive rules, agency regulations, and policies that pose potential constitutional
challenges. Thus, when considering the low amount of governmental restrictions that created constitutional conflicts, the small amount of religious
exemption cases is potentially more “judicially activist” by modern standards.
Indeed, higher numbers of judicially created religious exemptions would
likely be necessary to even attempt to maintain the scope of religious freedom the Founders envisioned.
One scholar has argued that not only were legislatures passing less laws
than they do now, the laws that they passed were much less likely to be
broadly applicable rules.99 Rather, most legislation consisted of “private
bills,” which included things like authorization for new roads, or grants or
contract awards to particular parties.100 Broad rules were mainly provided by
common-law rules, and the work of setting forth broad “standards” in legislation did not “dominate the business of legislation” for several decades after
the Founding.101 Chancellor Henry William DeSaussure from South Carolina explained, for example, that “judicial decisions . . . form the greater part
of the rules, regulating property, and governing the acts and contracts of
men.”102 James McCauley Landis observed that “[l]egislation of an early
date is often special in character, applying, like the judgment of a court, to a
particular situation brought to the attention of [the legislature]. The mod96 Id. at 27, 62 (“There were sixty-two cases between 1789 and 1861 in which the US
Supreme Court substantively evaluated the constitutionality of a federal statutory provision.
The Court struck down or imposed constitutional limitations on the applicable scope of
the federal law at issue in 32 percent of those cases.”).
97 WHITTINGTON, supra note 92, at 64; Eskridge, supra note 23, at 1012 (“Because many
judicial decisions of this period were unreported and some were unwritten, the cases I read
are not a complete sample even for the six states surveyed.”); see John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 571–74 (1993).
98 WHITTINGTON, supra note 92, at 30–32.
99 Peterson, supra note 89, at 720.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 DESAUSSURE, supra note 19, at xxvi.
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ern concept of wide and generalized legislative powers was of slow
growth.”103
Describing the proliferation of private bills and paucity of general standards, one early commentator said,
[Statutes] are of a political rather than a civil nature. . . . Of those which
prescribe rules of civil conduct to the citizens, rules for making and
expounding contracts, principles of decision on the questions daily agitated
in our courts of justice, the number is small; indeed, it may be a question,
whether our system of jurisprudence would suffer an injury by their total
repeal.104

Another lawyer in 1809 stated, “[t]he common law, legislates by principles; the
statute law, in detail. The former covers a multitude of cases, under a general
rule, well digested; and explained, applied and universally known by a long
practice.”105 In contrast, statutes “by attempting to provide for every particular case, and excluding every thing not expressly provided for, necessarily
omits many cases, and would leave them destitute of any rule of decision, if
the Judges had not the common law to fly to.”106 Thus, the need to create
judicial exemptions from broad, generally applicable statutory standards—as
opposed to adjustments in the common law—may also have been much less
likely than it would by our modern lights, where generally applicable laws are
the bread and butter of current legislative work.107
According to the legal historian Farah Peterson, it was not until the
1840s and 1850s that the role of the legislature began to shift, and this shift
was not complete until well after the Civil War.108 Rather than mainly passing private laws, legislatures began to enact more generally applicable laws.
This shifted whole swaths of administration of social and economic relations
from rules previously developed under the common law to statutory rules.109
103 James McCauley Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS
213, 215 (Roscoe Pound ed., 1934).
104 JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONTROLLING THE LAW: LEGAL POLITICS IN EARLY NATIONAL NEW
HAMPSHIRE 160 (2004) (quoting Jeremiah Smith, Book Review, in 1 MONTHLY ANTHOLOGY &
THE BOSTON REVIEW 138, 138 (1806) (reviewing Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the
Supreme Judicial Court of the State of from Sept. 1804 to June 1805)).
105 ANONYMOUS [JOSEPH HOPKINSON], CONSIDERATIONS ON THE ABOLITION OF THE COMMON LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 29 (Philadelphia, William P. Farrand & Co. 1809).
106 Id.
107 WHITTINGTON, supra note 92, at 63 (“Both Congress and the Court were less active
in the early decades of American history than they would become in later decades. The
legislative output of Congress was lower, and the Court’s docket was smaller. . . . Even so,
the pace of judicial review increased over time. Prior to the 1820s the Court, on average,
decided less than one case per year in which it reviewed the constitutionality of an application of a federal law. After that, the Court averaged one case per year, and this increased
after the 1840s.”).
108 Peterson, supra note 89, at 771–72.
109 See id. Of course, one could also argue that if there were fewer general statutes
intruding liberty, the Framers of the Constitution would have been less concerned about
this threat, and the First Amendment was unlikely to have been aimed at addressing a need
for exemptions from such laws.
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Additionally, as other scholars have recognized, “the culture of the
United States in the late eighteenth century was fairly homogeneous, being
composed almost entirely of Christian sects whose practices were unlikely to
violate non-religious societal norms.”110 Conflicts did arise in contexts such
as military conscription or swearing oaths, but statutes or the common law
“usually accommodated” these known and fairly limited minority views likely
to lead to conflict.111
The unsurprising limited historical record of judicially created exemptions in the religious context underscores the need to broaden our lens to
look at judicial norms across a range of personal rights. Indeed, understanding the norms of equitable exemptions becomes more important, not less,
when we face limited historical evidence of just one type of judicially created
exemption.
B. The Equitable Origins of Judicial Exemptions to Statutes in England
To understand the historical pedigree of English courts creating exemptions from statutes, one must understand the broader theories about parliamentary sovereignty in which such exemptions arose. Lord Coke famously
contended in Bonham’s Case that “the common law will controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of
Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible
to be performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to
be void.”112 While Coke’s statement suggests that acts of Parliament will, at
times, be void as against right and reason, Coke stops short of saying that
courts have authority to proclaim the acts void. Indeed, in the case before
him when Coke made this statement, Coke did not declare the law void, but
instead construed the law to be inapplicable to Bonham.113
Legal historians have long debated the meaning of Coke’s dicta regarding a void act.114 Sir John Baker has pointed to contemporaneous rejections
110 William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 363, 383 (1989).
111 Campbell, supra note 45, at 978.
112 Dr. Bonham’s Case (1610), 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652; 8 Co. Rep. 113b, 118a (KB)
(citations omitted). Coke was not the first jurist to express this view. St. German put into
the mouth of his doctor in the 1520s a theory that a statute against natural law (or the law
of reason) was not law at all, and therefore was void. CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAN, DOCTOR
AND STUDENT 97 (T.F.T. Plucknett & J.L. Barton eds., 1974) (1528). A similar argument
was made by Fortescue in the fifteenth century. But these arguments “bore little or no
fruit in the practice of the courts.” JOHN BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY 223 & n.125 (5th ed. 2019) (footnote omitted) (citing NORMAN DOE, FUNDAMENTAL AUTHORITY IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLISH LAW 75–78 (1990)).
113 Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 651.
114 S.E. Thorne, Dr. Bonham’s Case, 54 L.Q. REV. 543, 544–45, 548 (1938) (“[W]e
believe that some light may be thrown upon the problem by approaching it from the private law rather than from the constitutional law side, and we suggest that to some extent at
least, later doctrines of natural law have been reflected backward upon Coke’s statement,
giving it a content it did not in fact have. His words have been read so long in the light of
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of Lord Coke’s position and noted that this statement bore little fruit in the
practice of English courts.115 Whittington has argued,
It seems likely that in his own context, Coke was thinking about statutory
interpretation and the internecine rivalries of the English courts rather than
a form of modern judicial review in which courts could declare statutes null
and void. Certainly, later English judges did not take Coke’s assertions to be
so bold116

as some later American jurists claimed.
However, English courts did appear to enforce limits on the lawmaking
power of lower legislative bodies, such as municipal corporations, courts leet,
and guilds, which did not have Parliament’s sovereign power but were able to
make “bye-laws” by immemorial custom or royal grant.117 These legislative
bodies were prevented from legislating “in a way which would contradict the
common law by infringing the liberty of the subject.”118 Elizabethan judges
were frequently asked to review municipal bye-laws, basing their jurisdiction
on chapter 29 of Magna Carta.119
But as to acts of Parliament, political evolution in England regarding
first parliamentary supremacy and later parliamentary sovereignty led to a
narrow reading of Bonham’s Case with regard to parliamentary power.120 In
his widely read treatise,121 William Blackstone rejected the idea from Bontheories Coke did not contemplate that it is difficult now to dissociate them. It is nevertheless to this that we now turn.”); see also Theodore F.T. Plucknett, Bonham’s Case and Judicial
Review, 40 HARV. L. REV. 30, 49–61 (1926) (analyzing Bonham’s Case and contemporary
reactions to it). But see Barbara A. Black, The Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Colonists,
124 U. PA. L. REV. 1157, 1207–08 (1976) (arguing that Coke’s statement stood for the
proposition that judges had the power to void statutes violating the fundamental law).
115 BAKER, supra note 112, at 223. Baker also notes that even Coke appears to have
eventually changed his mind about this position. Id. at 223–24.
116 WHITTINGTON, supra note 92, at 40.
117 BAKER, supra note 112, at 225.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Eskridge, supra note 23, at 1006. The idea of parliamentary supremacy was not
entirely new in Blackstone’s era. Sir Thomas Smith asserted in 1565,
[t]he most high and absolute power of the realme of Englande, consisteth in the
Parliament. . . . The Parliament abrogateth olde laws, maketh newe, [and] giveth
orders for thinges past, and for thinges hereafter to be followed, changeth
rightes, and possessions of private men . . . . [T]o be short, . . . the parliament of
Englande . . . representeth and hath power of the whole realme both the head
and the bodie.
THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 48–49 (Leonard Alston ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1906) (1583). Thomas Egerton said in 1591 that Parliament can do anything. Sir
Francis Englefield’s Case (1591) 74 Eng. Rep. 779, 783; 4 Leo. 136, 141 (“Parliamentum
omnia potest.”).
121 “Blackstone’s Commentaries was the most widely read English law treatise in lateeighteenth-century America, and his account of statutory interpretation provides potentially valuable insights into the Founders attitudes.” Manning, supra note 20, at 35. The
Supreme Court has relied on Blackstone in a number of cases for a summary of the com-
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ham’s Case that courts could declare void acts of Parliament.122 Blackstone
concluded, “So long therefore as the English constitution lasts, we may venture to affirm, that the power of parliament is absolute and without control.”123 Blackstone’s Commentaries described an act of Parliament as “the
exercise of the highest authority that this kingdom acknowledges upon
earth.”124 Blackstone also insisted that even “if the parliament will positively
enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable,” there was “no power that
can control it” and judges were not “at liberty to reject it; for that were to set
the judicial power above that of the legislature, which would be subversive of
all government.”125
Blackstone, however, did leave some leeway for courts. He believed that
an act of Parliament “delivered in clear and intelligible terms, cannot be questioned, or its authority controlled, in any court of justice.”126 This “clear and
intelligible terms” caveat turned out to have been fairly significant. He noted
that
where some collateral matter arises out of the general words, and happens to
be unreasonable; there the judges are in decency to conclude that this consequence was not foreseen by the parliament, and therefore they are at liberty to expound the statute by equity, and only quoad hoc disregard it.127

Blackstone endorsed this “equitable” form of interpreting a statute as “the
correction of that, wherein the law (by reason of its universality) is deficient.”128 Because “all cases cannot be foreseen or expressed” in general
laws, he explained, “there should be somewhere a power vested of excepting
those circumstances which (had they been foreseen) the legislator himself
would have excepted.”129 In other words, courts could equitably create exemptions from statutes if such consequences were contrary to the common law or
law of reason. Regarding the definition of equity, Blackstone said, “[w]hat
equity is . . . I shall therefore only add” that it is used to “correct and soften
mon law that eighteenth and nineteenth century American lawyers would have studied.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 712 (1997); C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318
U.S. 133, 151 (1943); United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 138 (1936); Schick v. United
States, 195 U.S. 65, 69 (1904); Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 456, 463
(1854).
122 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *91.
123 Id. at *108.
124 Id. at *178.
125 Id. at *91; see also PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 237, 255, 398–99
(2008) (discussing how the “common law barred judges from” holding that “acts of Parliament” were “unlawful”).
126 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *447 (O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed., 12th
ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1873) (1826) (emphasis added); see 1 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 23, at *60, *62 (explaining that “the liberty of considering . . . cases in an equitable
light” must be limited to “where words [of a statute] bear either none, or a very absurd
signification”).
127 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *91.
128 Id. at *61 (emphasis added) (quoting GROTIUS, DE AEQUITATE § 3 (n.d.)).
129 Id. (emphasis added).
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the rigor of the law, when through it’s [sic] generality it bears too hard in
particular cases.”130
Equity did not always result in limiting statutory language. Sometimes it
resulted in “enlarg[ing]” of the statutory language to apply the language of
the statute to cases that would not ordinarily fall within the statute’s meaning.131 In other words, statutes could be read equitably in a way that limited
the language (and thus created exceptions to a natural reading), or that
broadened the language (and thus applied beyond a natural reading). The
British legal historian Theodore Plucknett observed ways in which courts
equitably interpreted statutes both to “restrict[ ] the scope of a statute by
excepting particular cases from its operation” in some instances, and in
others to “extend[ ] the application of statutes.”132 However, Plucknett suggested that this extension function by courts decreased over time.133 Similarly, Bill Eskridge noted that, while sometimes courts broadened statutes
equitably, “there was a general concern in England that there were too many
statutes that swept too broadly,” and this frequently “justified continuing judicial narrowing of statutes in a variety of cases.”134 James McCauley Landis
130 Id. at *92. One scholar has similarly noted that at its most basic level, equitable
interpretation just meant “that strict law would not be applied” based on other external
values or understandings. David Ibbetson, A House Built on Sand: Equity in Early Modern
English Law, in LAW & EQUITY: APPROACHES IN ROMAN AND COMMON LAW 55, 56 (E. Koops &
W.J. Zwalve eds., 2014).
131 1 KENT, supra note 126, at *465 (describing statutes that “are to receive an equitable
interpretation, by which the letter of the act is sometimes restrained, and sometimes
enlarged, so as more effectually to meet the beneficial end in view, and prevent a failure of
the remedy”); 6 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 386 (Henry Gwillim
ed., 5th ed. 1798) (“In some cases the letter of an act of parliament is restrained by an
equitable construction; in others it is enlarged.”); see Eyston v. Studd (1574), 75 Eng. Rep.
688, 699, 2 Plowden 459, 468 (KB) (Plowden’s note) (sometimes “the letter of a statute is
restrained,” and sometimes it is “enlarged, by equity”); deSloovère, supra note 20, at 591
(“Conceived discrepancies between the intention of the legislature and the meaning of
statutory words led at an early date to the doctrine of the equity of the statute, according to
which courts might vary the explicit meaning of the text whenever by supposed equity such
meaning ought for the sake of justice to be extended or restricted.”).
132 THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, STATUTES & THEIR INTERPRETATION IN THE FIRST HALF OF
THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 57–65, 72–81 (Harold Dexter Hazeltine ed., 1922); see also Manning, supra note 20, at 31–32 (“In one respect, the doctrine allowed judges to restrict the
general words of a statute when they produced harsh results apparently outside the statute’s policy.”).
133 PLUCKNETT, supra note 132, at 75 (describing cases in which the “court went in
extending the application of statutes, for the principle as well as the detail was subject to
such extension or restriction as the judges thought expedient,” but noting that this extension function occurred “more frequently, it will be observed, in the reign of Edward I than
of his grandson”).
134 Eskridge, supra note 23, at 1008. Eskridge contrasted this outcome with the heightened hesitancy of courts to add words to statutes. Id.; see also PETER BENSON MAXWELL, THE
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 254–57 (Gilbert H.B. Jackson ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell
Ltd. 8th ed. 1937) (1875) (citing a multiple statutes and cases from sixteenth to nineteenth
centuries, where courts created equitable exemptions from statutes); id. at 254 (“Enact-
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also explained that under the “doctrine of the equity of the statute . . . exceptions dictated by sound policy were written by judges into loose statutory
generalizations.”135 In sum, English courts could avoid inequitable consequences by, among other things, creating exceptions from statutes by reading
statutory language to apply less broadly than the plain text could allow. As
Plowden explained in 1574, “equity . . . puts an exception to the generality of
the text [of the statute law] for some reasonable cause.”136 And these judicially created exceptions are “as strong as if [they] had been expressly put in
the Act.”137
One method judges used to determine what constituted the most equitable application of a statute involved reliance on the “mischief rule.” This rule
focused on determining the context of the passage of the law and the problem, or mischief, the law was created to solve.138 Lord Coke discussed the
relationship between equitable interpretation and the mischief rule in his
Institutes of the Laws of England:
‘Equitie’ is a construction made by the judges, that cases out of the letter of a
statute, yet being within the same mischiefe, or cause of the making of the
same, shall be within the same remedie that the statute provideth: and the
reason hereof is, that for the law-makers could not possibly set downe all
cases in expresse terms.139
ments, also, which impose forms and solemnities on contracts on pain of invalidity, are
construed so as to be as little restrictive as possible of the natural liberty of contracting.”);
R v. Seas (1784), 168 Eng. Rep. 255, 255, 1 Leach 305, 305 (KB) (concluding that a capital
law prohibiting stealing “any goods, wares, or merchandises” from a stable did not apply to
theft of a coachman’s coat from a stable as it was not the type of typical “furniture” kept
within a stable, even though this fell within the plain language of the statute).
135 Landis, supra note 103, at 215–16.
136 Eyston, 75 Eng. Rep. at 465; BAKER, supra note 112, at 222 (quoting Plowden’s observation that sometimes the “sense and the reason of the law . . . is not as large as the letter”);
see also Samuel L. Bray, The Mischief Rule, 109 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at
5), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3452037 (“[A]s time passes, and
as a statute is pressed into service to answer questions never dreamed of at the time of its
enacting, the mischief rule will tend to serve this stopping-point function by offering a
narrower reading of the statute.”).
137 Eyston, 75 Eng. Rep. at 698 (Plowden’s note) (citation omitted) (“[T]he sages of our
law, who have had the exposition of our Acts of Parliament, have in these and many other
cases almost infinite restrained the generality of the letter of the law by equity, which seems
to be a necessary ingredient in the exposition of all laws.”).
138 See, e.g., Bray, supra note 136 (manuscript at 3). Bray describes how in early modern
legal usage, there does not appear to be a distinction between the mischief rule and the
doctrine of equity of the statute. Bray argues that subsequently, a divergence occurred,
and equity is more readily associated with broadening a statute, whereas mischief is more
readily associated with narrowing a statute. Id. (manuscript at 22 n.841) (citing Eskridge,
supra note 23, at 999).
139 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 21, at
24.b (Francis Hargrave & Charles Butler eds., Philadelphia, Robert H. Small 19th ed.,
1853) (1628). Plowden’s famous note to Eyston v. Studd also described the analysis courts
should engage in when equitably interpreting a statute.
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Blackstone illustrated how an equitable exception could be judicially derived
by looking to the mischief of the law. He described a law stating, “whoever
drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity.”140
Blackstone asked whether the law could punish a surgeon “who opened the
vein of a person that fell down in the street with a fit.”141 Blackstone thought
that the law could not be applied in this way. He analyzed “the effects and
consequence, or . . . reason of the law,” and explained that “the rule is, where
words bear either none, or a very absurd signification, if literally understood,
we must a little deviate from the received sense of them.”142 As Theodore
Sedgwick, an American lawyer, similarly explained, an equitable “construction ought to be put upon a statute as may best answer the intention the
makers had in view; and the intention is sometimes to be collected from the
cause or necessity of such statute.”143 Thus, judges would sometimes carve back
the scope of the statute—i.e., create a statutory exemption—for inequitable
circumstances that fell within the plain meaning of the statute but outside
the mischief or “necessity” of the statute.
Scholars disagree about when equitable interpretation took hold in
England, with some arguing it arose as far back as the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.144 Still others contend that the doctrine did not emerge in
a meaningful way until the fifteenth century in England.145 In St. German’s
early sixteenth-century treatise, he provides an early description of an equitable exemption, focused on mitigating the rigor of the law.146 He explains
that “[i]t is not possible to make any general rule of law but that it shall fail in
some case” where “to follow the words of the law were in some case both
against justice and the common wealth.”147 As a result, “in some cases it is
good and even necessary to [depart] the words of the law and to follow that
reason and justice requireth and to that intent equity is ordained / that is to
say to temper and mitigate the rigor of the law.”148 To do otherwise would
[A] man ought not to rest upon the letter only, . . . but he ought to rely upon the
sense, which is temperated and guided by equity, and therein he reaps the fruit of
the law, for as a nut consists of a shell and a kernel, so every statute consists of the
letter and the sense.
Eyston, 75 Eng. Reg. at 699 (citation omitted).
140 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *60 (citation omitted).
141 Id.
142 Id. at *59–60.
143 SEDGWICK, supra note 20, at 298 (emphasis added).
144 See deSloovère, supra note 20, at 592; Landis, supra note 103, at 215–17; William H.
Loyd, The Equity of a Statute, 58 U. PA. L. REV. 76, 77–78 (1909).
145 See Thorne, supra note 21, at 204; Manning, supra note 20, at 30.
146 ST. GERMAN, supra note 112, at 97.
147 Id. at 97. The original spelling used in this quote is as follows: “[A]ny generall rewle
of the lawe . . . shall fayle in some case” where “to folowe the wordes of the lawe/ were in
some case both agaynst Iustyce & the common welth.” Id.
148 Id. (emphasis omitted). The original spelling used in this quote is as follows: “in
some cases it is good and even necessary to leue the wordis of the lawe/ & to folowe that
reason and Justyce requyreth/ & to that intent equytie is ordeyned/ that is to say to tempre
and myttygate the rygoure of the lawe.” Id.
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be to allow a problematic “exception . . . [to] the law of reason.”149 Far
better, in such a circumstance, to equitably create an “exception” which is
understood “in every general rule of every . . . law.”150
Regardless of when it began, Manning has observed that a “fairly extensive version” of this equitable doctrine for statutory interpretation “was assimilated into England’s legal culture well before American independence”151
and was described in treatises and digests by the leading English jurists.152
This equitable interpretation method was thus an important norm understood by leading English and American jurists leading up to and immediately
following the American Revolution.153 And it should not be confused with
remedies specific to courts of equity, as opposed to courts of law. Manning
noted that the doctrine of the equity of the statute was often employed in
ordinary statutory interpretation decisions rendered by the law courts.154
Baker described equity “in the original sense of the term” as “judicial discretion to make the regular law function more effectively.”155 As James Wilson
149 Id. The original spelling used in this quote is as follows:
The whiche is no other thynge but an excepcyon of the lawe of god/ or of the
lawe of reason/ from the generall rewles of the lawe of man: when they by reason
of theyr generalytye wolde in any partyculer case Iuge agaynste the lawe of god/
or the lawe of reason/.
150 Id. The original spelling used in this quote is as follows: “whiche excepcion is
secretely vnderstande in euery generall rewle of euery posytyue lawe. And so it apperyth
that equytie taketh not away the very ryght/ but only that that [semyth to be ryght by the
generall wordes of the lawe/].” Id. (brackets in original).
151 Manning, supra note 20, at 32.
152 See 4 BACON, supra note 131, at 649 (“A statute ought sometimes to have such equitable Construction as is contrary to the Letter.”); 5 JOHN COMYNS, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 320 (London, A. Strahan 5th ed., corr., 1822) (“So, the judges expound a case
within the mischief and cause of an act, to be within the statute by equity, though it be not
within the words. . . . As, if a statute be remedial, it shall be extended by equity to other
cases within the same mischief.”); A DISCOURSE UPON THE EXPOSICION & UNDERSTANDINGE
OF STATUTES 140–41 (Samuel E. Thorne ed., 1942) (“Yt is therfore to be knowen that
sommetymes statutes are taken by equytye more then the wordes, sommetyme contrary to
the wordes, sommetyme it is taken strayctelye accordinge to the wordes, and sommetyme,
where there are no wordes in the statute and yet a case happenethe upon an estatute, the
commen lawe shall make a construccion.”); CHRISTOPHER HATTON, A TREATISE CONCERNING STATUTES, OR ACTS OF PARLIAMENT: AND THE EXPOSITION THEREOF 31–32 (London,
Richard Tonson 1677) (“All Statutes may be expounded by Equity so far forth as Epicaia
goeth, . . . and Law of Reason from the general words of the Law of Man.”).
153 While the practice of courts creating equitable exemptions to statutes was widespread, it was not uniformly accepted. Some courts rejected an equitable approach to
statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Nichols v. Wells, 2 Ky. (Sneed) 255, 259 (1803) (“[I]t is
[courts’] duty to declare what the law is and not what it should have been.”). One historian has noted that while equitable interpretation was not employed by all jurists, it was
employed by the most influential ones—those who were the “leading thinkers” and who
wrote the treatises and commentaries on early American law. Peterson, supra note 89, at
759.
154 Manning, supra note 20, at 30 (citing BLACK, supra note 25, at 57).
155 BAKER, supra note 112, at 216.
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noted, “[w]hen equity is taken in this sense, every court of law is also a court
of equity. When equity is taken in this sense—and, applied to the interpretation of law, this is its genuine meaning—it is an expression synonymous to
true and sound construction.”156 This practice provided an important judicial safety valve to avoid applications of laws that seemed, for a variety of
reasons, particularly problematic.
C. Equitable Exemptions in the Early American Republic
American political leaders rejected Blackstone’s notion of parliamentary
sovereignty, instead adopting theories about popular sovereignty that created
strict limits on legislatures. This shift in understanding about the location of
sovereign authority provided a new role for courts to declare certain laws
void in the early republic. In other words, while Lord Coke’s vision of judges
declaring laws void was waning in England, it was waxing and taking on real
meaning in the colonies.157
In his well-known Commentaries,158 Kent stated, “we cannot but admire
the intrepidity and powerful sense of justice which led Lord Coke . . . to
declare, as he did in Doctor Bonham’s Case, that the common law doth control
acts of Parliament, and adjudges them void, when against common right and
reason.”159 Kent went on to observe that “[t]he principle in the English government, that the Parliament is omnipotent, does not prevail in the United
States” if there is a “constitutional objection to a statute.”160 Indeed, in
America, all legislative bodies were viewed closer to subordinate Elizabethan
legislative bodies in England, which were prohibited from “contradict[ing]
the common law by infringing the liberty of the subject.”161 Thus, Kent
argued that
[t]he courts of justice have a right, and are in duty bound, to bring every law
to the test of the Constitution, and to regard the Constitution, first of the
United States, and then of their own state, as the paramount or supreme law,
to which every inferior or derivative power and regulation must conform.162
156 WILSON, supra note 25, at 260 (emphasis added).
157 Eskridge, supra note 23, at 1067 (footnote omitted) (“As it waned in England, the
voidance power waxed in America. Its earliest invocation by Supreme Court Justices was
the opinion of Chief Justice Jay, Justice Cushing, and Judge Duane for the New York Circuit regarding their appointment to adjudicate pension claims, subject to administrative
and then legislative review.”).
158 According to one source, Commentaries on American Law was a best-selling American
law book, and it became the legal text for many college students. JOHN THEODORE HORTON, JAMES KENT: A STUDY IN CONSERVATISM, 1763–1847, at 303–04 (1939) (“[N]o American work had ever earned so much money” and made it into the hands of many “college
youths” because “Kent had become the favorite preceptor of the legal profession.”).
159 1 KENT, supra note 126, at *448 (footnotes omitted); see also BAKER, supra note 112,
at 224 n.131 (Bonham’s Case “had some influence on the establishing of judicial review [of
legislation] in America”).
160 1 KENT, supra note 126, at *448.
161 BAKER, supra note 112, at 225.
162 1 KENT, supra note 126, at *449.
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And a judicial declaration that a law was void might amount to the judiciary
“disregard[ing] an unconstitutional act,” as with a portion of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 in Marbury v. Madison,163 or in holding “the law,” or a portion of
the law, as “inoperative.”164
Though debated by scholars,165 some historical evidence suggests that
the Founders anticipated judges playing an important role in enforcing constitutional limits, including in the form of enumerated rights, against legislatures. During the Constitutional Convention, Madison asserted that “[a] law
violating a constitution established by the people themselves, would be considered by the Judges as null & void.”166 When introducing the Bill of
Rights, Madison also explained,
163 Id. at *453 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
164 Id. at *453 (citing Lindsay v. E. Bay St. Comm’rs, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38 (1796)); see also
id. at *454 (“The theory of every government, with a written constitution, forming the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation, must be, that an act of the legislature
repugnant to the Constitution is void. If void, it cannot bind the courts, and oblige them
to give it effect; for this would be to overthrow in fact what was established in theory, and to
make that operative in law which is not law. It is the province and the duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is; and if two laws conflict with each other, to decide on the
operation of each. So if the law be in opposition to the Constitution, and both apply to a
particular case, the court must either decide the case conformably to the law, disregarding
the Constitution, or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law.”); 1 WILSON,
supra note 25, at 460 (“When repugnant commands are delivered by two different authorities, one inferiour and the other superiour; which must be obeyed? When the courts of
justice obey the superiour authority, it cannot be said with propriety that they control the
inferiour one; they only declare, as it is their duty to declare, that this inferiour one is
controlled by the other, which is superior. They do not repeal the act of parliament: they
pronounce it void, because contrary to an overruling law.”).
165 See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS, 1789–1888, at 73 (1985) (“[W]e are left with no obvious [constitutional]
peg on which to hang Marshall’s conclusion” regarding judicial review in Marbury);
HAMBURGER, supra note 125, at 462 (describing the lopsided historical debate in favor of
judicial review); ROBERT E. SHALHOPE, THE ROOTS OF DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN THOUGHT AND
CULTURE, 1760–1800, at 121 (1990); GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 322–25 (1991); WOOD, supra note 90, at 453–63; PAUL YOWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: MORAL AND EMPIRICAL REASONING IN JUDICIAL
REVIEW (2018) (arguing that constitutional review in the United States as currently
employed was not anticipated by the Framers of the Constitution); Carlos E. González,
Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV. 585, 636–59, 688–91 (1996); John Harrison, The Constitutional Origins and Implications of Judicial Review, 84 VA. L. REV. 333, 336
(1998) (defending Chief Justice Marshall’s decision in Marbury regarding the interpretive
question of judicial review); Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New
Contexts, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1060–64 (1997); William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review
Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 455 (2005) (arguing that judicial review before Marbury was “far more common than previously recognized”).
166 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 93 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1966) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS]; WHITTINGTON, supra note 92, at 54. Tocqueville wrote of the power of judicial review in America. He observed, “within its limits,
the power granted to the American courts to rule on the unconstitutionality of laws still
forms one of the most powerful barriers that has ever been raised against the tyranny of
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[i]f they [proposed amendments] are incorporated into the constitution,
independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark
against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will be
naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated
for in the constitution by the declaration of rights.167

Hamilton similarly argued in the Federalist Papers that
[t]he interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the
courts. A constitution . . . must be regarded by the judges as[ ] a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the
meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body.168

And in the case of an “irreconcilable variance . . . where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people,
declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter
rather than the former.”169 James Wilson assured Antifederalists that when a
federal law inconsistent with the Constitution came to the courts to be
applied to a citizen, the judges would find that “it is their duty to pronounce
it void.”170 John Marshall made similar assurances to Antifederalists in Virginia.171 And he asked rhetorically, “[t]o what quarter will you look for protection from an infringement of the Constitution, if you will not give the

political assemblies.” 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 175 (Eduardo
Nolla ed., James T. Schleifer trans., Indianapolis, Liberty Fund 2010) (1835). Similarly, a
popular Republican lawyer named Richard Rush asserted that
the courts are always in fact interfering with the government! Pass but an
embargo law; pass but an act for the enlistment of minors; let the legislature venture to . . . touch with only the pressure of a hair the supposed rights of the
citizen, and you will soon see what a storm will be raised about the ears of their
supposed sovereign authority.
RICHARD RUSH, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 11 (Washington, D.C. 1815) (emphasis omitted).
167 James Madison, James Madison, House of Representatives, 8 June 1789, in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 479, 484 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
168 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
169 Id. at 467–468.
170 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 417 (Jonathan Elliot ed. 1836) [hereinafter 2 DEBATES] (emphasis
omitted). Wilson also noted that unlike in England, “[i]n the United States, the legislative
authority is subjected to another control, beside that arising from natural and revealed law;
it is subjected to the control arising from the constitution.” 1 WILSON, supra note 25, at
460. And a “transgression” of “the bounds of the legislative power—a power most apt to
overleap its bounds,” must be “adjudged” by the “judicial department.” Id. at 462. Wilson
called this “a noble guard against legislative despotism.” Id.
171 3 DEBATES, supra note 170, at 553 (“If [Congress] were to make a law not warranted
by any of the powers enumerated, it would be considered by the judges as an infringement
of the Constitution which they are to guard. They would not consider such a law as coming under their jurisdiction. They would declare it void.”); WHITTINGTON, supra note 92, at
55.
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power to the judiciary? There is no other body that can afford such a
protection.”172
Along these lines, during the Constitutional Convention, North Carolina’s Hugh Williamson and Connecticut’s Oliver Ellsworth debated whether
the Constitution needed a prohibition on ex post facto laws. Ellsworth
thought an explicit provision was unnecessary because such laws were “void
of themselves” and thus would not be upheld by competent courts.173 Williamson did not disagree, but he pointed out that his state constitution had
an express provision dealing with this issue, and it had proved useful
“because the Judges can take hold of it.”174 Both seemed to agree that natural law principles would render this sort of legislation unconstitutional with
or without an express provision. But Williamson thought an express provision might embolden judges to enforce more strictly that principle against
legislatures.175 When debating the wording of the Second Amendment,
Ebgert Benson of New York explained that interpreting the wording would
be “a question before the Judiciary” relevant to “every regulation [the government would make] with respect to the organization of the militia, whether it
comports with [the Second Amendment] or not.”176
In the context of the Free Exercise Clause, St. George Tucker published
a famous View of the Constitution in 1803 that included an example of judicial
review.177 He stated that the judiciary operated as “a necessary check upon
the encroachments, or usurpations of power, by either of the other”
branches of government, which helped ensure that “no individual can be
oppressed.”178 He specifically argued that if “a law be passed by congress,
prohibiting the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates, or persuasions of a man’s own conscience,” or “abridging” other First Amendment
rights such as “speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to assemble
peaceably,” then it “be the province of the judiciary to pronounce whether
any such act were constitutional, or not.”179 And if the law was not constitutional, that province was “to acquit the accused from any penalty which might
be annexed to the breach of such unconstitutional act.”180
One famous early case that illustrated the judiciary’s willingness to
declare a law unconstitutional (and simultaneously reject the notion of parliamentary supremacy) was the 1795 decision of Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance.181 In that case, Justice William Paterson riding circuit issued a ruling
172 3 DEBATES, supra note 170, at 554.
173 WHITTINGTON, supra note 92, at 54 (quoting 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 166,
at 376).
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 751 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
177 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 293 (Liberty
Fund 1999) (1803).
178 Id. at 292–93.
179 Id. at 293.
180 Id.
181 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 28 F. Cas. 1012 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 16,857).
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explaining that legislatures in the United States did not exercise the “absolute and transcendant” power of the English Parliament but were instead
bound by the “permanent will of the people” as represented in the “fundamental law” of the Constitution.182 He stated:
The constitution is the work or will of the people themselves, in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity. Law is the work or will of the legislature in their derivative and subordinate capacity. The one is the work of the
creator, and the other of the creature. The constitution fixes limits to the
exercise of legislative authority, and prescribes the orbit within which it must
move. In short, gentlemen, the constitution is the sun of the political system, around which all legislative, executive and judicial bodies must revolve.
Whatever may be the case in other countries, yet in this there can be no
doubt, that every act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is
absolutely void.183

The court then held that the law was void.184 Interestingly, this case
eclipsed the subsequent 1803 Marbury v. Madison decision in the citations it
received on the subject in the early nineteenth century.185
As this voidness doctrine gained acceptance in America, equitable
exemptions also took on new importance. In England judges would strain to
interpret acts of Parliament to avoid unreasonable results that Parliament
could lawfully accomplish if it simply legislated clearly enough. In America, at
least in the constitutional context, judges strained to interpret legislation to
avoid unconstitutional results that legislatures could not lawfully accomplish,
even with absolute clarity. James Otis, in the colonies, described this equitable approach before the American Revolution, stating that “judges will strain
hard rather than interpret an act void, ab initio.”186 Perhaps this is why some
scholars have argued that American judges in the Founding period “interpreted statutory words more equitably than English judges . . . in the same
period.”187 Early American courts interpreted laws liberally to cohere
(rather than conflict) with constitutional principles that placed real limits on
legislatures.
Justice Story, riding circuit in Massachusetts, provided an example of this
sensibility in the early American republic. He stated:
Whenever it becomes our duty to decide on the constitutionality of laws,
sound discretion requires, that the court should not lightly presume an
excess of power by the legislative body; nor so construe the generality of words, as
182 Id. at 308, 28 F. Cas. at 1014.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 320, 28 F. Cas. at 1030 (“The confirming act is unconstitutional and void. It
was invalid from the beginning, had no life or operation, and is precisely in the same state,
as if it had not been made. If so, the plaintiff’s title remains in full force.”).
185 WHITTINGTON, supra note 92, at 58.
186 JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED 110 n.*
(Boston, Edes & Gill 1764).
187 Eskridge, supra note 23, at 1013 (“Without doubt, there is continuity between judicial construction of statutes in the United States in the 1780s and early 1790s and English
practice as reflected in Blackstone and Bacon.”).
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to extend them beyond its lawful authority, unless the conclusion be
unavoidable.188

In other words, even if general words could be read to include a problematic
(or unconstitutional) application of the law, a judge should not interpret the
words to extend to such a result and should cabin them to a lawful range of
application. By doing so, courts could enforce constitutional limitations by
“bend[ing] statutes” so as “not to infringe” on constitutional principles.189
Early jurists did not understand there to be this obligation to “bend” or
interpret laws liberally or equitably in every circumstance. As one judge
explained, “[t]hat a law is in itself inequitable . . . will not justify the court in
dispensing with it. This would be to usurp legislative power.”190 Rather, the
most important place for this method of interpretation arose when necessary
to conform statutes to higher “fundamental law,” which often took the form
of constitutional law. Chief Justice Marshall provided an important explanation of this point in his Fisher decision:
That the consequences are to be considered in expounding laws, where the
intent is doubtful, is a principle not to be controverted; but it is also true that
it is a principle which must be applied with caution, and which has a degree
of influence dependent on the nature of the case to which it is applied.
Where rights are infringed, where fundamental principles are overthrown, where
the general system of the laws is departed from, the legislative intention
must be expressed with irresistible clearness to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect such objects.—But where only a political regulation is
made, which is inconvenient, if the intention of the legislature be expressed
in terms which are sufficiently intelligible to leave no doubt in the mind
when the words are taken in their ordinary sense, it would be going a great
way to say that a constrained interpretation must be put upon them, to avoid

188 United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750)
(emphasis added).
189 WHITTINGTON, supra note 92, at 24 (quoting 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CRIMINAL LAW §153, at 142 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1856)); id. at 23 (“Story is
not proposing that the courts reserve the constitutional question for the future or defer to
legislative judgment on a contested constitutional point. . . . For Story, the question is
merely one of the forms by which courts enforce constitutional limitations on legislative
authority. If the statute is ‘clear and precise,’ the courts may have to declare it void. If the
statute is less clear, the courts may be able to announce that the proposed application of
the law exceeds the power of Congress and that such application will be regarded as offlimits and not judicially enforceable.”).
190 Wilson v. Wilson, 30 F. Cas. 248, 249 (C.C.D.C. 1805) (No. 17,848) (Kilty, C.J.); see
also Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (C.C.D. Va. 1813) (No. 4,564) (Marshall, Circuit
Justice) (observing that construction of a statute “is never to be carried so far as to
thwart . . . [the] policy which the legislature has the power to adopt”), aff’d, 13 U.S. (9
Cranch) 199 (1815); The Adventure, 1 F. Cas. 202, 204 (C.C.D. Va. 1812) (No. 93) (Marshall, Circuit Justice) (noting that the rule of lenity does not “overrule[ ]” the legislature,
but avoids “extend[ing] the law to cases to which the legislature had not extended it”),
rev’d, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 221 (1814).
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an inconvenience which ought to have been contemplated in the legislature
when the act was passed . . . .191

Thus, if general language of a statute caused ordinary political inconveniences, the text should be read in its “ordinary sense” even if inconvenient.
Indeed, in such contexts judges would engage in a strict textualist reading
even when doing so would lead to inconvenience or perhaps injustice.192 On
the other hand, courts would not interpret the general language of a statute
to violate “rights” or contravene “fundamental principles” unless the legislature had clearly required such a result. But if the legislature had been crystal
clear that it meant to transcend its constitutional authority, then in that case
the judiciary might have to declare the law void.193 As Justice Story
explained,
As little reason could there be to imagine the legislature would voluntarily
transcend its constitutional authority. The language must be very clear and
precise, which would impose on the court the duty of declaring the solemn
act of the legislature to be void. The court could never incline so to construe doubtful expressions, much less to seek astutely for hidden interpretations, which might darkly lead to such a result.194

Historians have noted that the late 1790s through early 1820s saw a high
point in equitable interpretation of legislation.195 Legal scholars of every
191 United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 389–90 (1805) (emphasis added).
192 Perhaps the inconveniences in these cases did not rise to the level of conflict with
natural law principles embodied in the common law or constitutions. For example, in
Flanegan v. Negley, the judge issued an opinion dealing with Pennsylvania’s mandatory arbitration act. 3 Serg. & Rawle 498, 499 (Pa. 1817). He stated,
The Court, however, are not ignorant of many inconveniences attending the arbitration system. They have, on several occasions, pointed them out. But it would
be a breach of duty in them, to assume the right of amending the law. They are
bound to give an honest interpretation to the acts of the legislature, according to
what appears to them to be their true meaning. When inconveniences are felt, it
is to be presumed, they will be remedied, by those to whom the Constitution has
entrusted the power. In conformity to the construction already established, I am
of opinion, that the judgment in this case should be affirmed.
Id. In a concurring opinion in this case, Judge Duncan similarly stated, “The inconveniences arising from this construction, are many, and call loudly on the legislature for
amendments and alterations. But this consideration will not justify the Court in departing
from the provisions of the act.” Id. (Duncan, J., concurring). And in another arbitration
decision in Morrison v. Weaver, the Pennsylvania court stated, “An appeal . . . is certainly not
expressly given [under the arbitration law at issue]; and this Court cannot supply that
which the legislature has totally omitted, even though we should suppose the omission
arose from an oversight.” 4 Serg. & Rawle 190, 190–91 (Pa. 1818). Thus, these cases illustrate limits, at least for some judges, in their willingness to bend statutes to their preferences, particularly if they did not see conflicting natural law or constitutional principles at
stake.
193 Wonson, 28 F. Cas. at 750.
194 Id.
195 Peterson, supra note 89, at 713 (“The late 1790s through the early 1820s saw a high
point in what contemporaries called ‘equitable interpretation’ of legislation—interpreta-
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stripe—including legal process theorists,196 advocates of textualism,197 and
critics of textualism198—have debated the relevance of equitable interpretation and its place in American constitutional law. But perhaps part of the
story is that during the early republic, judicial declarations that a law was void
were fraught with danger to judicial institutions.199 When judges issued such
decisions, they did so with an apologetic tone.200 Equity thus provided an
important and less controversial method for the judiciary to put a constitutional check on legislatures by molding the statutes into a form that cohered
with fundamental law.201
Where the legislature had drafted laws using broad and general language that could be read to sweep in constitutional interests, but did not
tion that allowed courts to mold statutes in conformity with common law precedent and
background legal norms. . . . This period of judicial collaboration in the legislative process
represents an important stage in early American legal development.”).
196 See, e.g., Landis, supra note 103, at 214–18; see also Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the
Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3
VAND. L. REV. 395, 400–01 (1950) (“[I]n the period of the Grand Style of case-law statutes
were construed ‘freely’ to implement their purpose, the court commonly accepting the
legislature’s choice of policy and setting to work to implement it. . . . Here the quest is not
properly for the sense originally intended by the statute, for the sense sought originally to
be put into it, but rather for the sense which can be quarried out of it in the light of the new
situation. Broad purposes can indeed reach far beyond details known or knowable at the
time of drafting. . . . [T]he sound quest does not run primarily in terms of historical intent.
It runs in terms of what the words can be made to bear . . . .”).
197 Manning, supra note 20, at 8.
198 Eskridge, supra note 23, at 995–98; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown
Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1523– 24 (1998).
199 Peterson, supra note 89, at 758–59 (“[D]uring the first few decades of the nineteenth century . . . judicial review for constitutionality . . . was still only very rarely used.
Judges of this generation understood that a decision striking down a statute was fraught
with danger to the institution of the court and should be hazarded only in extreme and
unavoidable cases of legislative wrongdoing.”).
200 See, e.g., Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199, 202 (1818).
201 Peterson, supra note 89, at 758–59 (“Although only some judges saw this as their
responsibility, these were scattered throughout the nation’s jurisdictions—[including] in
New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and Vermont, along with Francois-Xavier Martin in Louisiana, whose work became a
model for codifiers, and Jeremiah Smith from New Hampshire, the home jurisdiction of
Daniel Webster and other important lawyers.” (footnote omitted)). Peterson also went on
to note,
Equitable interpretation was accepted by the leading thinkers (perhaps I should
say the loudest, or most published, thinkers) on American law, but my sense is
that many judges considered creative interpretations of statutes out of bounds.
One point of similarity between Kent and the other judges who practiced equitable interpretation was their extreme erudition. Through extensive preparation
for their role as judges, they had achieved a perspective from which they believed
they could judge whether a statute transgressed a legal norm. Not all early nineteenth-century judges were well-educated in the law, however, so many had no
basis from which to oppose or correct the direction their legislatures had taken.
Id. at 759.
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require the result, courts argued the broad language was actually evidence the
legislature had not specifically wanted the law to apply in the unconstitutional context. In the 1817 New York case of Belknap v. Belknap, Judge Kent
addressed a law regarding the draining of swamps and bogs that defendants
argued authorized the government to dig a ditch on adjoining land to drain
a swamp.202 The act stated that if inspectors found it necessary “to continue” a “ditch or ditches through lands adjoining” the swamp land at issue,
“for the purposes of draining the same more effectually, they are authorized
to agree and settle with the owner or owners of such lands” or if agreement
cannot be reached to “apply to the Court to appoint appraisers” to assess the
damage of the ditch.203 The inspectors agreed to continue a ditch through a
pond on an adjoining plot of land in order to drain a neighboring swamp,
though the outcome of this ditch would have been to drain a pond that was
important to downstream property owners.204 Despite this authority technically falling within the broad language of statute, the court rejected this reading. The court observed, “it appears that this outlet is at the distance of one
mile from the termination of the main ditch above alluded to.”205 The court
concluded that “the inspectors have given too extended a construction to
their powers under the act.”206
The court noted that the authority to create a continual ditch on adjoining lands was “an invasion of the rights of property,” and thus “it is evident
that the act could only have had in view cases of the most immaterial and
trifling consequence, or the power would never have been granted with so little
check.”207 The court analogized to how carefully legislatures did act when
they had meant to give government officials power to create highways over
private land.208 The court then contrasted that with the vague and general
language here about continuation of ditches, and how it would be a “stretch
of power never within the contemplation of the act” to allow the inspectors to
drain the lake.209 In other words, the statute in Belknap could be inter202 Belknap v. Belknap, 2 Johns. Ch. 463, 463–64 (N.Y. Ch. 1817).
203 Id. at 362.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 363.
207 Id. (emphasis added).
208 Id.
209 Id. at 364.
Can we suppose that this act intended that these inspectors should carry their
ditches where they pleased, without any regard to the improvements of others? I
am entirely persuaded, that the project of draining this little lake, and thereby
destroying one mill, and affecting, more or less, all the others which are supplied
by its waters, is a stretch of power never within the contemplation of the act. It
would be an unreasonable and dangerous construction. The power given was
supposed to be harmless. It was never intended to touch and materially injure
valuable improvements on adjoining lands; much less was it intended to break up
useful ancient streams, and the natural and capacious reservoirs which fed them.
Id.
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preted to give inspectors the authority to widen an outlet if necessary to drain
the wetlands and “continue” the ditch. But because this would have deviated
from norms about private property rights, the court interpreted the statute
more narrowly than the text would allow.210
One early and prominent example of the Supreme Court engaging in
the type of “bending” Justice Story described involved the 1800 case of Mossman v. Higginson.211 The Court rejected a broad—and arguably the most
natural—reading of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which extended jurisdiction of
the federal circuit courts to:
all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in
dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars,
and the United States are plaintiffs, or petitioners; or an alien is a party, or
the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a
citizen of another State.212

Most of this statutory language tracked the diversity jurisdiction provided to
federal courts under Article III, but the reference to “an alien” did not match
any language in the Constitution’s jurisdictional grant. The Court ruled that
the Judiciary Act could not be construed to extend to a jurisdictional grant to
aliens, as this would run contrary to the Constitution. “[T]he 11th section of
the judiciary act can, and must, receive a construction, consistent with the constitution.”213 Note that the Court spoke in terms of construing this statute
equitably to avoid the unconstitutional outcome of allowing courts to entertain suits with aliens, rather than pronouncing the Judiciary Act as written
repugnant to the Constitution.214 But in truth, the outcome in this case
looks less like a construction of any sort of ambiguous language, and more
like a refusal of the Court to apply the Act to extend jurisdiction to some
cases that would exceed the bounds of Article III.
Nine years later in a similar case called Hodgson v. Bowerbank, the Court
again explained that it lacked jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act even where
210 Id. at 363. Virginia’s Judge Spencer Roane equitably interpreted an inheritance law
in Virginia to avoid conflict with republican principles. In Tomlinson v. Dillard, Judge
Roane explained that while he “respect[ed] the Legislature of our country,” he nevertheless felt “no hesitation to say, that this law . . . was anti-republican and aristocratic; founded
on false principles, and on a total dereliction of the policy of the [earlier] act.” 7 Va. (3
Call) 105, 110 (1801). As a result, he voted to limit the textual effect of the change in the
new law.
211 Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12, 14 (1800).
212 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (emphasis added).
213 Mossman, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 14 (emphasis added).
214 The Court went on to explain,
[I]t is true [that the Judiciary Act says], in general terms, that the Circuit Court
shall have cognizance of suits “where an alien is a party;” but as the legislative
power of conferring jurisdiction on the federal Courts, is, in this respect, confined to suits between citizens and foreigners, we must so expound the terms of the
law, as to meet the case, “where, indeed, an alien is one party,” but a citizen is the
other.
Id.
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one party was an alien.215 The Court required that “the defendant . . . be
expressly stated to be a citizen of some one of the United States. Otherwise
the courts of the United States have not jurisdiction in the case.”216 In
explaining why it interpreted that statute as having this construction, the
Court said, “the statute cannot extend the jurisdiction beyond the limits of
the constitution.”217
Contemporaneous treatise writers described the constitutional significance of these cases, which placed the statute “in subordination to the constitution.”218 But this subordination need not come solely through the judicial
power to declare laws void. Judges could also equitably modify laws to comply with the Constitution. In his 1827 Digest of the Laws of the United States,
Thomas Gordon observed, “An act of congress, contrary to the constitution
of the United States, is void—and courts of justice are bound so to declare it,
or to modify the law according to the constitution, if the case admit such modification.”219 Gordon cited both Mossman and Hodgson as cases to support this
proposition.220 John Bouvier similarly cited Mossman for the proposition
that “these general words” in the “judiciary act” must be “restricted by the
provisions in the constitution.”221
D. The Presumption of Legislative Compliance with the Constitution
When courts used equitable interpretation to avoid unconstitutional outcomes in the early republic, they often relied on the legal fiction that the
legislature would not have intended its law to be applied in an unconstitutional way. In his Commentaries, Kent quoted Blackstone, but then added this
qualifier:
When it is said . . . that a statute contrary to natural equity and reason, or
repugnant, or impossible to be performed, is void, the cases are understood
to mean that the courts are to give the statute a reasonable construction.
They will not readily presume, out of respect and duty to the lawgiver, that any
215 Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809).
216 Id. at 303–04 (emphasis omitted) (case reporter notes).
217 Id. at 304.
218 1 FRANCIS J. TROUBAT & WILLIAM M. HALY, THE PRACTICE IN CIVIL ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS, IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 91 (Philadelphia, R.H. Small 1837) (citing among others Mossman, 4 U.S. 12; Hodgson, 9 U.S. 303). John Pomeroy similarly wrote
that even if Congress provided federal courts with jurisdiction through a statute, such a
statutory power “is still a nullity if it transcends the scope of the constitutional grant.” JOHN
NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 759, at 517 (New York, Hurd & Houghton 1868).
219 1 THOMAS F. GORDON, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1 (Philadelphia,
L. Ashmead & Co. 1827) (emphasis added).
220 Id.; WHITTINGTON, supra note 92, at 75.
221 3 JOHN BOUVIER, INSTITUTES OF AMERICAN LAW 107 (Philadelphia, Childs & Peterson
1858).
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very unjust or absurd consequence was within the contemplation of the
law.222

Similarly, while serving as an Associate Supreme Court Justice, James Wilson
relied on Aristotle for the proposition that using equity was a required form of
statutory interpretation, out of respect for the legislator, when general statutes led to problematic applications.223 And in his Commentaries on the Criminal Law, Joel Bishop stated that judges should construe or apply statutes to
avoid constitutional conflicts on the assumption that the “legislature
intended its acts to be . . . constitutional.”224
An 1808 Massachusetts case provides an example in which the court
noted that if it did not interpret the law equitably, giving a presumption of
lawful intent to the legislators, the court would have to perform the harsher
remedy of declaring the law void.225 In Baxter v. Taber, Judge Parsons analyzed a case about a debtor’s escape from the terms of the debtor’s bond to
the prison.226 Debtors imprisoned during this period were given more latitude by the prison to roam the prison “yard” and sometimes even public
roads.227 This treatment was meant to be “humane to debtors,” unlike other
felons or criminals.228 Here, there was a dispute about the prison’s ability to
extend the limits of the “yard” to cover other private residences.229 Judge
Parsons explained, “It is urged, that by virtue of [general language in the
statute], the sessions may extend the limits of the gaol yard, at its pleasure,
including within its limits a whole town, and making every man’s house and
land part of the prison, of which the sheriff has the custody.”230 In the face
of this argument, Judge Parsons responded, “We are, however, satisfied that
no opinion could have less foundation.”231 The court reasoned that “[t]o
222 1 KENT, supra note 126, at *447–48 (emphasis added). He also added, “[W]e cannot but admire the intrepidity and powerful sense of justice which led Lord Coke . . . to
declare . . . that the common law doth control acts of Parliament, and adjudges them void,
when against common right and reason.” Id. at *448.
223 2 WILSON, supra note 25, at 260–62. “By Aristotle, equity is thus defined—‘the correction of that, in which the law is defective, by being too general.’ In making laws, it is
impossible to specify or to foresee every case . . . [I]n interpreting them, those cases should
be excepted, which the legislator himself, had he foreseen them, would have specified and
excepted.” Id. at 260 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). This interpretation “is drawn
from . . . the motive which prevailed on the legislature to make it.” Id. Wilson also quoted
Blackstone in his discussion of “excepting those circumstances which (had they been foreseen) the legislator himself would have excepted.” 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *61.
224 1 BISHOP, supra note 189, § 153, at 142 (“We have seen, that statutes are sometimes
void as unconstitutional, and as contrary to natural justice. But courts will always presume
the legislature intended its acts to be reasonable, constitutional, and just, and will so construe them as not to infringe these principles.”).
225 Baxter v. Taber, 4 Mass. (4 Tyng) 361, 365 (1808).
226 Id. at 364.
227 Id. at 365.
228 Id. at 364–66.
229 Id. at 365.
230 Id.
231 Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-1\NDL102.txt

92

unknown

Seq: 38

notre dame law review

5-NOV-20

8:12

[vol. 96:1

give a power of this extent to the sessions, could not have been within the intent
of the statute: and if the legislature had intended it, it is manifest that the
execution of the power would have been unconstitutional.”232
But what did courts mean when they employed this legal fiction of a
lawful legislative intent? According to Manning, “Blackstone did not . . .
equate [equitable interpretation] with the search for actual or likely intent”
of the legislature.233 Similarly, Sam Bray has observed that judicial references to “true intent” of the legislatures was a “product of its time” that did
not require “a search for the subjective intent of members of Parliament.”234
Rather, as Sir John Baker observed, “[T]he intention of the [law] makers
could only be a kind of fiction, a constructive intention to be gathered from
the wording, and especially from the preamble which purported to explain
it.”235 The more subjective search for legislative intent we now associate with
purposivism came about much later with a transformation initiated by Henry
Hart and Albert Sacks.236
Indeed, when Blackstone encouraged judges to create exceptions that
legislators would have created “had they . . . foreseen” the circumstances,
Blackstone explicitly rejected the use of subjective legislative intent as governing authority.237 He analogized to Roman laws where the custom was to
send questions of interpretation of the law to the emperor to “take his opin232 Id. (emphasis added). The court determined the application of the law would have
been unconstitutional because “it would have been an appropriation of private property to
public uses without compensation to the proprietors.” Id.; see also Dupy v. Wickwire, 1 D.
Chip. 237, 238–39 (Vt. 1814) (“Even if the legislature should have specially provided, that
the deponent, should be liable to all the pains and penalties of wilful and corrupt perjury,
for false swearing; such ex post facto provision would have been void, as being against the
constitution of this State, the constitution of the United States, and even against the laws of
nature. The deposition, therefore cannot be admitted on the authority of the act of the
legislature.”).
233 Manning, supra note 20, at 36.
234 Bray, supra note 136 (manuscript at 14–15) (quoting Heydon’s Case (1584) 76 Eng.
Rep. 637, 638 (Ex.)).
235 6 JOHN BAKER, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 1483–1558, at 79–80
(2003). See also Bray, supra note 136 (manuscript at 15) (describing the “fiction” of legislative intent being a constructive intention).
236 Bray, supra note 136 (manuscript at 19–20). See also Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reading
Statutes in the Common Law Tradition, 101 VA. L. REV. 1357, 1370 (2015) (“Legal process
theorists Professors Hart and Sacks thought courts should adopt an interpretation that best
promotes the purpose of the statute and the legal system as a whole, so long as the text
would ‘bear’ that reading. The purpose the court should impute to the legislature is not
an actual, historical intent or purpose, but should flow from the assumption that legislation is an act of ‘reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.’ Their central example of this technique for inferring purpose is, again, Heydon’s Case, which attends
not to the text or historical intention, but rather the ‘mischief’ in the old law and the ‘true
reason for the remedy.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW
1374–80 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994))).
237 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *61–62.
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ion upon it.”238 He described this as a “bad method of interpretation,” and
said similarly that “[t]o interrogate the legislature to decide particular disputes . . . affords great room for partiality and oppression.”239 This was in
part “[b]ecause a bare resolution, confined in the breast of the legislator,
without manifesting itself by some external sign,” could not provide advance
“notif[ication] to the people who are to obey it,” and thus “can never be
properly a law.”240 Thus, “[t]he fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator, is by exploring his intentions at the time when
the law was made, by signs the most natural and probable.”241 These “signs”
include things like “the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and
consequence,” and the “cause which moved the legislator to enact” the law to
begin with.242
This final “sign” of the legislative will is related to the mischief rule,
meaning the doctrine that a statute should be interpreted so as to correct the
mischief or problem the law was originally passed to solve.243 And as Blackstone explained, “when this reason [for the law’s enforcement] ceases, the
law itself ought likewise to cease with it,” even if the words could be extended
further.244 This limiting interpretation of the law, consistent with the “cause
which moved the legislator to enact” the law, is what Blackstone described as
“equity,” or the “correction of that, wherein the law (by reason of its universality) is deficient.”245
Consistent with a more objective legal fiction approach to legislative
intent, Kent stated in his Commentaries that “the intention of the lawgiver is to
be deduced from a view of the whole, and of every part of a statute.”246
Beyond that inquiry,
the intention [of the legislature] is to be collected from the context, from
the occasion and necessity of the law, from the mischief felt, and the objects
and the remedy in view; and the intention is to be taken or presumed,
according to what is consonant to reason and good discretion[, following
the] maxims of sound interpretation . . . .247
238 Id. at *58.
239 Id.
240 Id. at *45.
241 Id. at *59.
242 Id. at *59, *61.
243 Bray, supra note 136 (manuscript at 3, 18–19).
244 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *61.
245 Id.
246 1 KENT, supra note 126, at *461–62.
247 Id. at *462–63; see also Woodruff v. State, 3 Ark. 285, 285 (1841) (“Such a construction ought to be put upon a statute as may best answer the intention the makers had in
view; and this intention is sometimes to be collected from the cause or necessity of making
the statute, and sometimes from other circumstances. When discovered, the intention
ought to be followed with reason and discretion in the construction of the statute,
although such construction seems contrary to the letter [of the statute].”); Humbert v. St.
Stephen’s Church, 1 Edw. Ch. 308, 312 (N.Y. Ch. 1832).
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In other words, Kent focused his analysis on what the legislature should have
intended, and this included lawful purposes to which the law could be
applied consistent with constitutional laws.248
Chancellor DeSaussure similarly described in his commentary what was
meant by legislative “intent” in the context of equitable interpretation. He
quoted an “English writer” stating that “[e]quity is a judicial interpretation of
the laws, which presupposing that the legislator intended what is just and
right, pursues and effectuates such intention.”249 He later said, “no legislator, however learned or sagacious, ever did, or can provide by statute for the
infinite variety of cases perpetually growing out of the complex and ever varying relations and transactions of men.”250 However, he also emphasized the
importance of deriving meaning “in the first place” from the “statutes
enacted” themselves.251
Perhaps one of the most fascinating examples is from Vermont’s Judge
Nathaniel Chipman, who had a chance to rule on a similar statute that he
had actually debated when he served before as a member of the legislature.252 In Starr v. Robinson, Chipman addressed a new statute providing
“that all bond or bonds which have been taken by the Sheriff . . . are, hereby
discharged.”253 The case was brought by a debtor who, after being committed to the debtor portion of the prison until his debt was paid, had “escaped
from the liberties of the prison,” and afterward his debt was assigned to a
third-party creditor to collect the debt.254 The debtor argued that this new
statute relieved him of his debt now to this third-party creditor. Judge Chipman addressed the debtor’s argument that “the act is too clear to admit of
construction, that the words are express” and clearly include “all bonds.”255
Judge Chipman admitted, “[t]he act, indeed, sets out with a very broad
expression, ‘all bond or bonds’ and if this clause were not explained by what
precedes and what follows, it might almost afford a pretext for the defendant’s construction.”256 Yet Judge Chipman stated that if the legislature had
made absolutely clear that the law meant to remove a debt obligation to a
private third party as well, this interpretation would have been
unconstitutional:
248 Peterson, supra note 89, at 735 (“Kent did not seek the legislature’s purpose in the
records of legislative debates or other circumstantial evidence that might have revealed the
legislators’ actual intent. Instead, he focused his analysis on what the legislature should
have intended, using as a guide his own sense of the background law and what he believed
were proper legislative goals.” (emphasis omitted)).
249 DESAUSSURE, supra note 19, at xxxi (quoting 3 RICHARD WOODDESSON, LECTURES ON
THE LAW OF ENGLAND 145 (Philadelphia, John S. Littell 1842)).
250 Id. at xxvi.
251 Id.
252 Peterson, supra note 89, at 755 (“[H]e did participate in the assembly debate on an
act that came before his court in an 1814 case.”).
253 1 D. Chip 257, 258 (Vt. 1814).
254 Id. at 257.
255 Id. at 258 (emphasis added).
256 Id. at 260.
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It ought further to be observed, that had the provision under consideration,
been so clearly expressed as clearly to admit of the defendant’s construction,
yet it could not avail him, it could not be permitted to operate; it would have been a
palpable violation of the constitution of the United States, which renders null and
void every act, even of a state legislature, made in violation of any express
provision of that constitution. In that instrument it is expressly declared that
no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts.257

Judge Chipman concluded by emphasizing the interplay between courts’
interpretation of an objective, constitutional legislative intent as a presumption that the legislature was not trying to violate the Constitution. And his
mode of construction was in some ways giving the benefit of the doubt to
himself, given his previous position on the legislature when this law was
passed. “[C]ertainly the Court ought anxiously to avoid any construction of a
law which would imply in the legislature either an ignorance of their powers
and duties, or a design to violate the national constitution.”258
Many additional cases illustrate the interplay between early “modifications” of statutes to avoid unconstitutional applications and the legal fiction
of appropriate legislative intent.259 Judge Tilghman from Pennsylvania
explained that “it must be acknowledged, that general expressions are sometimes
to be modified” when the application “would produce a degree of injustice not
to be attributed to the legislature.”260 While riding circuit, Justice Samuel
Nelson observed that the Judiciary Act was “defective in respect to the jurisdiction conferred upon the circuit courts.”261 But he noted that “the meaning intended by congress” was to avoid violating the Constitution, and courts
were required to construe the statute “in connection with the provision of
the constitution.”262 In South Carolina, a court noted, “It is clear, that statutes passed, against the plain and obvious principles of common right, and
common reason, are absolutely null and void, as far as they are calculated to
operate against those principles.”263 The court reasoned that “[i]n the present
instance, we have an act before us, which, were the strict letter of it applied to
the case of the present claimants, would be evidently against common reason” because it would result in “a forfeiture of property.”264 The court thus
determined it was “bound to give such a construction” to the statute that
would be “consistent with justice,” and to assume that the “legislature never
had it in their contemplation” to lead to the forfeiture of property.265
It was true that sometimes unavoidable conflicts would arise between the
Constitution and the plain language of statutes. In such a context, a Pennsylvania judge in 1825 noted:
257 Id. at 260–61 (emphasis added).
258 Id. at 261 (emphasis added).
259 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 92, at 75.
260 Waln v. Shearman, 8 Serg. & Rawle 357, 360 (Pa. 1822) (emphasis added).
261 Prentiss v. Brennan, 19 F. Cas. 1278, 1279 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1851).
262 Id.
263 Ham v. McClaws, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 93, 95–96 (Ct. C.P. 1789).
264 Id. (emphasis omitted). Sadly, the “property” at issue in this case involved slavery.
265 Id.
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when a judge is convinced, beyond doubt, that an act has been passed in
violation of the constitution, he is bound to declare it void, by his oath, by
his duty to the party who has brought the cause before him, and to the people, the only source of legitimate power, who . . . formed the constitution of
the state.266

But this judge also noted, “Nevertheless, the utmost deference is due to
the opinion of the legislature,—so great, indeed, that a judge would be
unpardonable, who, in a doubtful case, should declare a law to be void.”267
Courts should instead assume that the legislature intended its law to be constitutional. Judges understood it as their obligation to employ this legal
fiction of assuming that the legislature did not clearly intend the unconstitutional application when it drafted broad and general language in the statute.268 In such contexts, courts would functionally carve back such
problematic applications of the statute.
E. The Evolution of Constitutional Adjudication
Whittington has pointed to early equitable interpretation cases that
served as historical analogs for modern as-applied constitutional challenges.269 As-applied challenges essentially result in a judicial narrowing of
statutory application to comply with constitutional mandates.270 Two key
moves appear to have occurred over time, described further below. First,
judges spoke more clearly in terms of conflicts with constitutional requirements, rather than lofty rhetoric about fundamental principles or natural
law. Second, judges moved away from relying on the legal fiction of legislative intent to justify mental gymnastics in an unnatural statutory construction
and more candidly started to explain that certain applications of statutes
were simply unconstitutional (as opposed to the statute itself being declared
void).
In the early republic, judges employed equitable interpretation as a way
to mold statutes to higher law principles that judges discerned, including, but
not limited to, constitutional limitations. One important complexity,
though, is that for many Founding-era jurists, constitutional principles, principles of justice, and the common law were viewed as interchangeable princi266 Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 339 (Pa. 1825) (“The people declared, also, on
their adoption of the constitution of the United States, ‘that it should be the supreme law
of the land, and that the judges in every state should be bound thereby, any thing in the
constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.’” (quoting U.S. CONST.
art VI, cl. 2)).
267 Id. at 340.
268 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 92, at 23–24.
269 See id.
270 For further discussion of how exemptions are simply one form of as-applied challenges, see Stephanie H. Barclay & Mark L. Rienzi, Constitutional Anomalies or As-Applied
Challenges? A Defense of Religious Exemptions, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1595, 1596 (2018).
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ples, all derived from the natural law.271 In the Massachusetts case of Holden
v. James, for example, Judge Jackson equated constitutional and natural law
principles, stating that delegating certain powers to government would be
“manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and natural justice,
and to the spirit of our constitution and laws.”272 In this same vein, in Dupy
v. Wickwire, the court noted that interpreting the law as an ex post facto law
“would have been void, as being against the constitution of this State, the
constitution of the United States, and even against the laws of nature.”273
From a modern lens, this makes it difficult to determine when courts understood themselves to be engaging in constitutional versus common-law adjudication, or whether they even believed there was a difference between the two
modes of adjudication.274
Rhode Island provided an early example of constitutional adjudication
not being necessarily wedded to a written constitution in the 1786 case of
Trevett v. Weeden.275 The court invalidated a law that precluded jury trials for
defendants who had refused to accept the state’s paper money as legal tender
and described the law as unconstitutional, despite the fact that Rhode Island
did not have a written constitution at the time.276 Nevertheless, this case is
“understood as part of the development of a judicial power to hold statutes
unconstitutional.”277 The lawyers challenging the Act described it as “unconstitutional & void.”278 This case highlights how “constitutional” principles
271 See Judd Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246, 254
(2017) (explaining how constitutional values and natural law principles (as embodied in
the common law) were often discussed in tandem and equated); 1 BISHOP, supra note 189,
§ 153, at 142 (“We have seen, that statutes are sometimes void as unconstitutional, and as
contrary to natural justice.”). Chancellor DeSaussure stated that “equity is synonimous to
justice.” DESAUSSURE, supra note 19, at xxxi (quoting 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at
*429). To be sure, some jurists separated these principles. See, e.g., 1 WILSON, supra note
25, at 460 (“In the United States, the legislative authority is subjected to another control,
beside that arising from natural and revealed law; it is subjected to the control arising from
the constitution.”).
272 Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396, 405 (1814).
273 1 D. Chip. 237, 238 (Vt. 1814).
274 See Eskridge, supra note 23, at 1015 (“For the most part, the state statutory interpretation decisions were like Miller and Darby: the judges attended to the statutory words and
the whole statute, read the words in the context of the matter regulated and the spirit of
the statute, and were quietly willing to narrow or expand the letter of enacted law in light
of the common law, the legislative policy, common sense and good reason, and higher law
norms such as the law of nations or constitutional principles.”). But see Larry D. Kramer,
The Supreme Court 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 39–40 (2001)
(“Rights under th[e] constitution were drawn from a variety of sources, moreover, of which
natural law was only one, and not necessarily the most important one at that.”).
275 See HAMBURGER, supra note 125, at 435–36; WHITTINGTON, supra note 92, at 45.
276 See HAMBURGER, supra note 125, at 443; WHITTINGTON, supra note 92, at 45.
277 HAMBURGER, supra note 125, at 436. For further discussion of the case, see id. at
435–49.
278 Id. at 441.
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were often interchangeable with background natural law principles and the
common law.
Viewed from this historical perspective, early Founding-era judges interpreted statutes equitably in a range of different contexts, including but not
limited to constitutional contexts. As Judge Thomas Ruffin from North Carolina believed, “the role of the judge was to incorporate legislation into the
general fabric of jurisprudence by interpreting it to cohere, rather than conflict, with preexisting legal structures.”279
But in later decades, equitable interpretation increasingly occurred
“under the aegis of fundamental principles embodied in the Constitution”
with judges emphasizing “the common law less and constitutional values
more.”280 Courts became more transparent about when they were engaging
in explicit constitutional adjudication, and over time courts used fewer references to equity.281 No matter what label it was given, equitable “interpretation” or “bending” or “modification” of statutes thus seemed to have more
staying power in the context of avoiding unconstitutional outcomes. Over
time judges presented themselves “less as wise men applying precepts and
more as experts of the complex mechanism of law or even as mere wordsmiths.”282 This was possibly, in part, because equitable interpretation
outside constitutional contexts became increasingly difficult to square with
separation of powers norms in the new republic.283 According to Manning,
“when judges promote constitutional values by shading statutory meaning
(within a range that the statutory language will bear), their action surely has
a firmer basis” than equitable interpretation “which draws upon more openended conceptions of external moral principles.”284
279 Peterson, supra note 89, at 753; see, e.g., Frew v. Graham, 4 N.C. (Taylor) 609, 609
(1817). Nathaniel Chipman, a Vermont judge, similarly explained, “[J]udges, from the
nature of their official employment, are informed of the difficulties, which arise in the
interpretation of the laws, and of those cases, in which they prove deficient, unequal, or
unjust in their operation. Such information is highly necessary to the legislative body.”
NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT 126 (Rutland, J. Lyon
1793).
280 Eskridge, supra note 23, at 1060, 1084.
281 Id. at 1084.
282 Id. at 1008; Peterson, supra note 89, at 770 (“During the Jacksonian era, the American judiciary was [also] forced to redefine itself, now as an integral part of a democratic
republican government. The surge of populism that carried Jackson into the presidency in
1828 signaled the rise of a political party obsessed with democratic legitimacy in government office and deeply suspicious of delegated authority. These trends, combined with
Democrats’ disdain for erudition and their repudiation of the condescension of an earlier
generation’s ‘natural aristocracy,’ forced judges interpreting statutes to find new ways to
justify their role in the lawmaking process.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 394, 396 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907))).
283 Manning, supra note 20, at 56–58 (“[B]icameralism and presentment . . . cannot
easily be squared with the exercise of broad judicial lawmaking authority outside the constitutionally ordained legislative process.”).
284 Id. at 125.
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As judges relied less on notions of “equity” and more on technical conflicts with the Constitution, “equitable interpretation . . . fell away, and judicial review for constitutionality took [its] place.”285 But even after
interpreting statutes to comport with external moral principles fell away, the
principle of limiting statutes to comport with higher constitutional principles
remained. By 1835, Tocqueville used much different language than that of
Justice Story or Chief Justice Marshall to describe the constitutional adjudication in which American courts were engaging. He did not refer to liberally
“interpreting” statutes, but instead used the sort of descriptions we now use
for modern as-applied challenges. He stated, “Americans have recognized
the right of judges to base their decisions on the constitution rather than on
the laws. In other words, they have allowed them not to apply laws that would
appear unconstitutional.”286 Tocqueville later explained, “[W]hen the judge
challenges a law in an obscure debate and on a particular application, he partially conceals the importance of the challenge from the eyes of the public.
His decision intends only to strike an individual interest; the law is harmed
only by chance.”287
Other state courts began to move away from reliance on congressional
intent and speak more transparently about the type of as-applied constitutional remedy they were providing from overly broad statutes. In Massachusetts, a court reasoned that because a particular “construction” of a statute
“would make it conflict with the Constitution of the United States,” the court
“therefore must presume that such was not the intention with which the act was
framed.”288 This sentence about legislative intent sounds in the types of
Blackstonian equitable arguments courts had historically made. But the
court did not end with this analysis. Rather, it continued, “or if it was so [that
the legislature had an unconstitutional intent], then the intention must be held
to be ineffectual. . . . In applying the statute, its general terms are made to
conform to narrower limits of the judicial powers as established by the constitutional provisions.”289
One possible explanation for the decreased reliance on the fiction of
legislative intent may be that it just was not as necessary in America as it had
been under English common law. In England, where Parliament was sovereign, courts did not have authority to strike down discrete applications of
laws. Thus, courts’ ability to bend or modify laws only came by asserting that
judges were simply fulfilling Parliament’s true wishes. As Plowden explained,
285 Peterson, supra note 89, at 771 (“Judicial review, while more rigid and more authoritarian, was more acceptable to the new political culture because it represented a claim to a
specialized expertise that legislatures did not share. These moves preserved a sphere for
judicial action that was not poisonous to Jacksonian political tendencies. Legal ‘science’
does not compete with popular sovereignty, because it posits a law that is rather than a law
that does.”).
286 1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 166, at 170 (emphasis altered).
287 Id. at 174 (emphasis added).
288 Florence Sewing Mach. Co. v. Grover & Baking Sewing Mach. Co., 110 Mass. 70, 80
(1872) (emphasis added).
289 Id. at 80–81 (emphasis added).
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“in order to form a right judgment when the letter of a statute is restrained
. . . by equity,”290 then you should “suppose that the law-maker is present,
and that you have asked him the question you want to know touching the
equity, then you must give yourself such an answer as you imagine he would
have done, if he had been present.”291 In America, where legislatures were
not sovereign and were subject to real external constitutional limits enforced
by courts, this legal fiction was not necessary in the same way to authorize
courts to limit certain applications of statutes.292
In 1870, The Supreme Court for the first time spoke in terms of the
constitutionality of a statute “when applied” to specific contracts.293 The
Court first used the specific term “as applied” to refer to a constitutional
challenge in the 1890 case of Leisy v. Hardin.294 There, the dissent described
previous cases as holding that “statutes were held to be constitutional, as
applied to” certain factual situations.295 In 1892, “Justice Brewer was the first
Supreme Court Justice to write of a ‘challenge’ to a ‘law’ or a ‘statute.’ ”296
290 Eyston v. Studd (1574), 75 Eng. Rep. 688, 699, 2 Plowden 459, 468 (KB) (Plowden’s
note); BAKER, supra note 112, at 222.
291 Id.
292 An additional practical reason for relying on the intent of legislatures under early
English common law was that for centuries statutes were not written down carefully or kept
in an accessible location. It was not until 1810–22 that an official version of the Statutes of
the Realm was published, but even this volume was acknowledged to be incomplete. BAKER,
supra note 112, at 219.
293 Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 529, 553 (1870) (“[W]e hold the acts of Congress
constitutional as applied to contracts made either before or after their passage.”).
294 To find this case, I searched “as applied” in Westlaw and filtered by U.S. Supreme
Court cases. On December 20, 2019, this search brought back 132 cases. The earliest case
is Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 136 (1890).
295 Leisy, 135 U.S. at 136 (Gray, J., dissenting).
296 Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209,
1230–32 (2010) (“[T]he law as found in the office of the [S]ecretary of [S]tate is beyond
challenge.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 9 (1892)
(Brewer, J.))); see also Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 225 U.S. 540, 548 (1912)
(Hughes, J.) (“The appellant challenges the constitutional validity of the statute . . . .”). As
noted by Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, “Six state court opinions had previously used the
‘challenge to statute’ formulation.” Rosenkranz, supra, at 1230 n.63 (noting how this
phrasing eventually caught on, and we have countless subsequent examples); cf. State v.
Creditor, 24 P. 346, 346 (Kan. 1890) (“He appeals, and challenges the validity of the statute.”
(emphasis added)); State v. Dinnisse, 41 Mo. App. 22, 22 (Ct. App. 1890) (“The defendant
in his brief challenges the constitutionality of the law under which he was prosecuted.” (emphasis added)); Livesay v. Wright, 6 Colo. 92, 96 (1881) (“This, in effect, challenges the statute as
unconstitutional.” (emphasis added)); Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Haley, 25 Kan. 35, 52–53 (1881)
(“[T]he defendant’s counsel challenge the constitutionality of the statute in a long and able
argument.” (emphasis added)); Hallenbeck v. Hahn, 2 Neb. 377, 398 (1872) (“We may
well, therefore, call upon those who challenge the validity of the law of 1869 to point out the
section of that instrument which has been disregarded in its enactment . . . .” (emphasis
added)); People v. Carpenter, 24 N.Y. 86, 92 (1861) (“Those who challenge the existence of the
law, were called on to show the notices were not given.” (emphasis added)).
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Even after 1890, though, courts continued to engage in creative “interpretation” or “bending” of statutes to avoid unconstitutional outcomes.297
Still, the as-applied terminology appears to have gained prominence through
the early 1900s,298 even as aggressive “interpretation” of statutes declined. By
1913, the Supreme Court contended that it was better for courts to be transparent about the unconstitutionality of statutory applications, rather than liberally construe statutes beyond a meaning the plain language could bear.299
The risk of such a requested approach “in the manner now asked for would
be to make a new law, not to enforce an old one.”300 Thus, better for courts
to simply speak in terms of unconstitutionality, rather than engage in linguistic gymnastics to save it.
It was not until the 1970s that the Court formally described its two forms
of judicial review of statutes as “facial challenges to statutes” and “as-applied
challenges to statutes.”301 In the modern context, the Court has continued
297 See, e.g., Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1909) (engaging in aggressive
interpretation of an immigration act to avoid a constitutional conflict).
298 See, e.g., Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373, 374–75 (1941) (citing
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Roddewig, 292 N.W. 142 (Iowa 1940)) (noting that the Iowa
Supreme Court “held that the Iowa Use Tax as applied to these mail orders is unconstitutional”); Weems v. Bruce, 66 F.2d 304, 307–08 (10th Cir. 1933) (concluding a law was
unconstitutional and void as applied to foreign corporations); Hixon v. City of Philadelphia 32 Pa. D. & C. 436, 442–43 (Ct. C.P. 1938) (“We therefore conclude that, as applied to
plaintiff, the ordinance imposing a 10 percent tax on gross receipts from all transactions in
or for the parking of automobiles on open parking lots is constitutional, and that council
had the power to enact it.”); State v. Sheldon, 213 P. 92, 96 (Wyo. 1923) (“A statute unconstitutional as to a certain class, but constitutional as applied to other classes, may be held to
have been intended to apply to the latter, if that appear to be in harmony with the purpose
of the Legislature.”); Sloane v. Commonwealth, 149 N.E. 407, 407 (Mass. 1925) (The laws
“purporting to authorize the excise, were declared ‘illegal, unconstitutional and void’ as
applied to the petitioner by the Supreme Court of the United States in a judgment rendered on May 4, 1925.” (quoting Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S.
203 (1925)) Notably the judgment mentioned in the earlier U.S. Supreme Court case (268
U.S. 203) does not use the “as applied” language.); Joel v. Bennett, 115 N.E. 5, 7 (Ill. 1916)
(“[B]ut in such case the law is invalid only as applied to the particular conditions and valid
as applied to other conditions.”).
299 See Butts v. Merchs.’ & Miners’ Transp. Co., 230 U.S. 126, 135 (1913).
300 Id. (quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875)).
301 Rosenkranz, supra note 296, at 1230–32 & n.69. The phrase “facial challenge” first
appeared in the Supreme Court opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 403 U.S. 602, 665 (1971)
(White, J., concurring) (“Although I would also reject the facial challenge to the Pennsylvania statute, I concur in the judgment . . . .”). The phrase appeared a few more times in
the following decade. See Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 761 (1976)
(“It has not been the Court’s practice, in considering facial challenges to statutes of this
kind, to strike them down in anticipation that particular applications may result in unconstitutional use of funds.”); Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 94 (1976) (“Our usual
practice, as the Court notes, is to entertain facial challenges based on vagueness and overbreadth by anyone subject to a statute’s proscription.”); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975) (“[W]hen considering a facial challenge it is necessary to proceed
with caution and restraint, as invalidation may result in unnecessary interference with a
state regulatory program.”); Alexander v. Ams. United Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 757 (1974)
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with these two forms of constitutional challenges. The Court has described
facial challenges as “the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since
the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which
the Act would be valid.”302 When a statute is facially invalid, generally all
applications of the statute are invalid.303 The statute is, as it was understood
historically to be, void.304
The much more common modern constitutional remedy is the asapplied remedy. The Court has explained that “the ‘normal rule’ is that ‘partial, rather than facial, invalidation is the required course,’ such that a ‘statute . . . may be declared invalid to the extent that it reaches too far, but
otherwise left intact.’ ”305 In this vein, the Supreme Court has described asapplied challenges as “the basic building blocks of constitutional adjudication.”306 An as-applied challenge arises when the Court is being asked to
decide whether it is constitutional for a statute to be applied to a particular
factual situation.307 Sometimes the Justices may conclude that a statutory
provision is constitutionally problematic, at least for the circumstances of the
case before them. Such as-applied invalidations effectively narrow the scope
of a statute but do not necessarily render a judgment about all its possible
applications.308 As Richard Fallon has explained, the meaning of statutes
(“Because their objections to the Service’s action included a facial challenge to the constitutionality of federal statutes . . . .”). As Rosenkranz explained, “Only in recent years has
the phrase become ubiquitous.” Rozenkranz, supra note 296, at 1232 n.69. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167 (2007) (“[A]ppellees are making a facial challenge to a
statute” (quoting Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 514 (1990))); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 739 (1997) (discussing when parties “mak[e] facial
challenges to state statutes”).
302 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
303 See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 329–30 (2006)
(“[T]he courts below chose the most blunt remedy—permanently enjoining the enforcement of New Hampshire’s parental notification law and thereby invalidating it entirely.”);
WHITTINGTON, supra note 92, at 17.
304 But see Jonathan F. Mitchell, The Writ-of-Erasure Fallacy, 104 VA. L. REV. 933, 937
(2018) (arguing that it is a fallacy to act as though laws have been erased by judicial declarations of voidness).
305 Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329 (alteration in original) (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades,
Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504, (1985)); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985);
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180–83 (1983).
306 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 168 (quoting Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1328 (2000)).
307 As Whittington has explained,
More often, the Court is asked to evaluate a statute that is already being applied
and can be considered within a specific factual situation. . . . The decision to
uphold a statute, however, is always a decision to uphold its particular application
in the case at hand. The justices may conclude that the litigant is not entitled to
have the effects of the statute set aside in the specific case before the Court, but
that does not necessarily mean that there are no circumstances under which the
statute’s application would be constitutionally defective.
WHITTINGTON, supra note 92, at 16.
308 Id.
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“frequently must be specified through case-by-case applications; the process
of specification effectively divides a statutory rule into a series of subrules;
and in most but not all cases, valid subrules can be separated from invalid
ones, so that the former can be enforced, even if the latter cannot.”309 This
modern remedy is important for purposes of this Article because, as I have
written elsewhere, religious exemptions are simply one form of as-applied
challenges.310
Scholars have vigorously debated the contours, appropriateness, and
even reality, of facial versus as-applied challenges.311 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court embraces these two dominant modes of modern constitutional adjudication.312 It is not clear, however, that the Court has ever recognized the equitable historical antecedent of as-applied challenges to statutes.
III. IMPLICATIONS
The foregoing sheds light on Founding-era religious exemption cases.
Contrary to the assertions of scholars,313 Founding-era cases granting religious exemptions would not have been viewed as “aberrant legal analysis.”314
Rather, such cases would have been part of a broader established norm connected to equitable interpretation of statutes, which became an important
tool for enforcing constitutional limits on legislatures.
This Part also highlights how two early religious exemption cases—Phillips and Cronin—fit within these broader judicial practices and understandings. Section A discusses the ways in which an understanding of equitable
interpretation undercuts at least three of the assumptions the Court relied
on in Smith. Section B discusses an implication of equitable interpretation
that provides additional historical support for the type of analysis courts
engage in under a modern religious exemption framework.
309 Fallon, supra note 306, at 1325–26 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
310 Barclay & Rienzi, supra note 270, at 1596.
311 Compare Fallon, supra note 306, at 1326 (arguing all challenges are really as-applied
challenges), with Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American
Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 157 (1998) (arguing that all challenges must be
facial because all rights are rights against rules, which must be challenged facially).
312 See Luke Meier, Facial Challenges and Separation of Powers, 85 IND. L.J. 1557, 1557–58
n.3 (2010) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s “as-applied” preference confirms its “fidelity
to the traditional model” (quoting David L. Franklin, Looking Through Both Ends of the Telescope: Facial Challenges and the Roberts Court, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 689, 697 (2009)));
Gillian E. Metzger, Facial and As-Applied Challenges Under the Roberts Court, 36 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 773, 773 (2009) (“One recurring theme of the Roberts Court’s jurisprudence to date is
its resistance to facial constitutional challenges and preference for as-applied litigation.”);
Rosenkranz, supra note 296, at 1233, 1239 (“[T]he Court insists that ‘as-applied’ challenges
are the most common and preferred form of constitutional challenge.”).
313 See supra Section I.B.
314 Bradley, supra note 15, at 292.
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A. Smith Relied on Assumptions Unfounded by Historical Evidence
In Smith, Justice Scalia argued that religious exemptions would be a
“constitutional anomaly,”315 that neutral and generally applicable statutes
were entitled to deference rather than scrutiny,316 and that providing exemptions would undercut rule-of-law norms and create a system that was “courting anarchy.”317 It turns out that all three of Justice Scalia’s concerns are
undercut by the historical evidence.
1. Judicially Created Exemptions Were a Default Norm, Not an Anomaly
Contrary to Justice Scalia’s assertion,318 or the arguments of other scholexemptions from generally applicable laws were not anomalous at the
Founding period. To the contrary, as discussed above, scholars who have
surveyed Founding-era cases outside the religious context found a substantial
number where courts “had no problem announcing exceptions to old,
broadly-phrased laws where application” contradicted other forms of fundamental law.320 At English common law, Theodore Plucknett observed how
regularly judges created equitable exceptions to the application of broad statutory language.321 James Landis also explained that “exceptions dictated by
sound policy were written by judges into loose statutory generalizations.”322
Historians such as Professors Wood and Rakove have emphasized the early
republic was a period where attitudes were “emphatically favorable” towards
“a judicial willingness to bend statutory words to avoid clashes with constitutional principles.”323 And of course Blackstone described the important judiars,319

315 Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885–86 (1990).
316 Id. at 885 (emphasizing the need to protect “[t]he government’s ability to enforce
generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct”).
317 Id. at 888.
318 Id. at 885–86.
319 See supra Section I.B.
320 See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 23, at 1021–22.
321 PLUCKNETT, supra note 132, at 57–65, 72–81; see also Manning, supra note 20, at
31–32 (“In one respect, the doctrine allowed judges to restrict the general words of a statute when they produced harsh results apparently outside the statute’s policy.”). Similarly,
Eskridge noted that “there was a general concern in England that there were too many
statutes that swept too broadly,” and this “justified continuing judicial narrowing of statutes
in a variety of cases.” Eskridge, supra note 23, at 1008. Eskridge contrasted this outcome
with the heightened hesitancy of courts to add words to statutes. Id.; see also R v. Seas
(1784), 168 Eng. Rep. 255, 255, 1 Leach 305, 305 (KB) (concluding that a law prohibiting
stealing “any goods, wares, or merchandises” from a stable did not apply to theft of a
coachman’s coat from a stable, even though this fell within the plain language of the statute); MAXWELL, supra note 134, at 254–57 (citing multiple cases from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries where courts construed broad statutes not to apply to outcomes contrary
to the common law).
322 Landis, supra note 103, at 213, 215.
323 Eskridge, supra note 23, at 1018.
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cial function “of excepting those circumstances, which (had they been
foreseen) the legislator himself would have excepted.”324
In the specific context of religious exemptions, both the Phillips and
Cronin courts appear to have been aware of this default norm and assumed
that the norm should govern in the religious context absent specific precedent to the contrary. The judges in both cases noted the lack of historical
evidence for the particular religious exemption request they were dealing
with. In Phillips, the court noted that “[t]here are no express adjudications
in the British courts applied to similar or analogous cases.”325 But rather
than treat the lack of cases as an obstacle to a religious exemption, as Justice
Scalia did, the court said that the lack of cases meant that nothing would
“contradict the inferences to be drawn from the general principles which
have been discussed and established” regarding protection of religious rights
in the face of general requirements.326 In other words, without precedent to
the contrary, the court was free to modify the general rule to cohere with
constitutional requirements just as courts did with other sorts of rights or
fundamental laws.
Similarly, in Cronin the court observed that “[i]t is a little remarkable
that the whole range of English Reports furnish no case in which the question has ever arisen” regarding the type of religious exemption being
requested by a Catholic priest.327 Rather than use this as a reason not to
provide an exemption in this case, the court determined this lack of precedent “has strongly impressed me with the conviction, that the exemption of a
Catholic priest is . . . a principle of law so well recognized there, that it has
been deemed useless to make it the subject of adjudication.”328 The court
instead looked for precedent to the contrary, and concluded that “in
England during centuries whilst the Catholic religion prevailed there no case
can be found in which the disclosure was coerced.”329 The court thus took
the lack of precedent preventing exemptions as a situation in which default
constitutional equitable traditions would govern the analysis.330 And this
default norm required providing the priest an exemption from the rule.
The Cronin court also noted that in the United States the question had
only been “twice decided,” both “in favor of exempting a Roman Catholic
priest from disclosing confessions made to him.”331 We only have record of
one of these decisions, and it is People v. Phillips.332 The Cronin court
324 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *61 (emphasis added).
325 SAMPSON, supra note 39, at 103.
326 Id.
327 Commonwealth v. Cronin, 1 Q.L.J. 128, 134 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1856).
328 Id. at 134. The court also noted the possibility “that the relation of priest and penitent has been held so delicate and sacred, that no one had the hardihood to draw aside the
veil, which conceals it from public gaze.” Id. at 134–35.
329 Id. at 141.
330 See id. at 141–42.
331 Id. at 136.
332 While I have not been able to locate a record of the case the Cronin court mentioned, there is record of a different criminal case decided four years after Phillips. In
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acknowledged that while the “question has never been adjudicated in any of
the courts of last resort in the United States,” the two decisions cited were
“persuasive” and “derive[d] additional weight from the eminent and learned
names connected with them.”333
The court also noted the broader legal landscape, in which these sorts of
religious exemptions were afforded by legislatures in New York, Missouri,
Wisconsin, Michigan, and in countries such as Scotland.334 In the court’s
mind, these legislative exemptions provided additional evidence that an
exemption was also required here by the judiciary. Note that the court did
not look at these legislative exemptions as evidence that the business of providing an exemption was solely the responsibility of the legislature.
Thus, both courts assumed that precedent or historical evidence was
needed to show that such an equitable exemption would not be required.
Without such contrary precedent, judicial norms of granting exemptions to
cohere rules with higher laws controlled the outcome.
Justice Scalia and Bradley have both belittled the importance of People v.
Phillips because it dealt with a common-law rule, and not a statute.335 Scalia
stated that Phillips “is weak authority . . . because it did not involve a statute,
and the same result might possibly have been achieved (without invoking
constitutional entitlement) by the court’s simply modifying the common-law
rules of evidence to recognize such a privilege.”336 The same could be said
of Cronin.
But there are a few problems with this argument. First, the two cases
Justice Scalia relies on as denying religious exemptions similarly do not
involve any clear request for an exemption from a statute as opposed to a
common-law rule.337 We simply lack evidence one way or another about
People v. Smith, a New York court declined to extend the privilege to a protestant minister,
reasoning that confession was not a required sacrament in the protestant faith. 2 N.Y. CityHall Recorder 77 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1817). However, interestingly, the minister in that case
also apparently did not assert any privilege or have any problem discussing what the defendant had disclosed—so he was not requesting an exemption. Id.; see also Walter J. Walsh,
The Priest-Penitent Privilege: An Hibernocentric Essay in Postcolonial Jurisprudence, 80 IND. L.J.
1037, 1051 (2005). Ultimately in 1828 the New York legislature adopted a statute that
codified and substantially broadened the Phillips privilege: “No minister of the gospel, or
priest of any denomination whatsoever, shall be allowed to disclose any confessions made
to him in his professional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or
practice of such denomination.” Cox v. Miller, 296 F.3d 89, 103 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting
N.Y. Rev. Stat. 1828, pt. 3, ch. 7, tit. 3, § 72). For an excellent in-depth discussion of the
facts surrounding the Phillips case, see STEVEN T. COLLIS, DEEP CONVICTION: TRUE STORIES
OF ORDINARY AMERICANS FIGHTING FOR THE FREEDOM TO LIVE THEIR BELIEFS 7–12 (2019).
333 Cronin, 1 Q.L.J. at 136–37.
334 Id. at 137.
335 Bradley, supra note 15, at 290; City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 543 (1997).
336 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 543 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (footnote omitted).
337 Id. (first citing Philips v. Gratz (Simon’s Executors), 2 Pen. & W. 412 (Pa. 1831) (a
Jewish man requested a continuance for a trial date, which was not a rule coming from a
statute); and then citing Stansbury v. Marks, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 213, 1 L. Ed. 353 (Pa. 1793)
(the court does not indicate the rule came from a statute, nor that a religious exemption
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what an early court would have done with a clear religious exemption request
to a statutory general rule.
Second, in taking this position, Justice Scalia misunderstands the equitable relationship between statutes and the common law in the early republic.
Specifically, as discussed in Section II.A, statutes were viewed as a reflection
of or amendment to the common law that courts wove into the fabric of
other general principles. In his pamphlet The Rights of the British Colonies
Asserted and Proved, James Otis argued that “all antient and modern acts of
parliament . . . can be considered as part of, or in amendment of the common law.”338 Similarly, Judge Thomas Ruffin from North Carolina explained
“that the role of the judge was to incorporate legislation into the general
fabric of jurisprudence by interpreting it to cohere, rather than conflict, with
preexisting legal structures.”339 As a result, judges often equitably modified
statutes in the same way they modified the common law to protect individual
rights and principles of justice. As scholars have noted, “The most famous
statutory interpreter of that period was Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice of the
Court of King’s Bench (1756–1788)—and he construed statutes almost as
dynamically as he reconfigured the common law.”340 This phenomenon
extended widely to other jurists in the early republic as well.341
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in both Phillips and Cronin, the
courts equated the method they would use to analyze either common-law
rules or any other “law of the state” that impinged on religious freedom.342
The Phillips court specifically commented on equitable limits on the legislawas specifically requested, nor why the court denied it if it was requested)). Simon’s Executors similarly does not appear to deal with an exemption request from a statute. Instead, it
involved a contract action that
had been set for trial on a Saturday and the plaintiff, Levi Philips, who was Jewish,
moved for a continuance on the ground that “he had scruples of conscience
against appearing in court to-day, and attending to any secular business; and that
he believes his presence and aid will be material in the progress of the cause.”
McConnell, supra note 11, at 1508. Perhaps the only case that involved a clear written law
at issue was Permoli, but the Court never addressed the question on the merits. Permoli v.
Mun. No. 1 of New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 601, 610 (1845).
338 OTIS, supra note 186, at 108.
339 Peterson, supra note 89, at 753; see, e.g., Frew v. Graham, 4 N.C. (Taylor) 609, 609
(1817). Nathaniel Chipman, a Vermont judge, similarly explained, “[J]udges, from the
nature of their official employment, are informed of the difficulties, which arise in the
interpretation of the laws, and of those cases, in which they prove deficient, unequal, or
unjust in their operation. Such information is highly necessary to the legislative body.”
CHIPMAN, supra note 279, at 126.
340 Eskridge, supra note 23, at 1008.
341 Other courts observed that “principles of natural religion are part of the common
law.” Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394, 401 (Pa. 1824).
342 SAMPSON, supra note 39, at 111 (“Suppose that a decision of this court, or a law of the
state should prevent the administration of one or both of these sacraments, would not the
constitution be violated, and the freedom of religion be infringed? Every man who hears
me will answer in the affirmative.” (emphasis added)); see Commonwealth v. Cronin, 1
Q.L.J. 128, 138 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1856).
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ture for religious rights, concluding that “no human legislator has a right to
meddle with religion.”343 And the Cronin court also stated that if “any other
principle of law” deprived any religious group of “one of the sacraments of
their Church, and thus deny to them the ‘free exercise of their religion
according to the dictates of conscience,’ ” such groups “should be held
exempt from the operation of any such rule, or principle of law.”344 Thus, the
fact that these cases specifically dealt with a general rule originating in the
common law does not necessarily limit the relevance of their default equitable analysis in favor of exemptions.
2. Broad, Generally Applicable Statutes Were Not Immune from Judicial
Scrutiny
Justice Scalia argued that generally applicable laws should not be subject
to heightened judicial scrutiny.345 The contrary result, he said, would create
“a private right to ignore generally applicable laws.”346 Subsequently in his
City of Boerne concurrence, he argued that the historical evidence supported
an understanding that religious exercise should be protected only “so long as
it does not violate general laws governing conduct.”347 Scalia relied on various
sources, including Hamburger, for the proposition that “[e]very breach of a
law is against the peace” and “freedom” only included “the right ‘to do only
what was not lawfully prohibited.’ ”348
Yet this argument begs the question about how judges went about determining what was “lawfully prohibited” under laws to begin with. Under equitable interpretation of statutes, judges determined that many applications of
a statute would not themselves be lawful, thus requiring exemption.349
Indeed, a court’s refusal to apply a statute in light of constitutional limitations followed from a recognition that the constitutional limitations were
themselves part of the law.350 And in providing a judicially created religious
exemption for the application of a law, a judge would essentially issue a ruling that a religious objector had never violated a law to begin with.351
343 SAMPSON, supra note 39, at 109 (emphasis added).
344 Cronin, 1 Q.L.J. at 140 (emphasis added).
345 Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888–89 (1990).
346 Id. at 886. Vincent Phillip Muñoz similarly argued that “[i]f the state is furthering a
legitimate civic interest, indirect burdens on religious beliefs and practices do not violate
the rights of religious liberty.” Vincent Phillip Muñoz, How the Founders Protected the Natural
Right of Religious Liberty, NAT’L REV. (Dec. 7, 2018, 6:30 AM) (emphasis added), https://
www.nationalreview.com/2018/12/founders-protected-religious-freedom-first-amendment
-natural-rights/.
347 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 539 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
348 Id. at 539–40 (first quoting Queen v. Lane (1704) 87 Eng. Rep. 884, 885, 6. Mod.
128, 129 (QB); and then quoting Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemption, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 591, 624 (1990)); see also Hamburger, supra
note 5, at 918.
349 See supra Section II.C.
350 See supra Part II.
351 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cronin, 1 Q.L.J. 128, 142 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1856).
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Scalia’s thumb on the scale in favor of any generally applicable legislation is also not borne out by the historical evidence. Judges often viewed
broad and general language skeptically, as a mandate that needed to be
reined in to prevent problematic applications. Blackstone, for example,
described the defect inherent in laws by nature of their broad universality.352
James Wilson similarly criticized legislation as “defective” when the language
was “too general.”353 Along these lines, in Belknap Judge Kent found that
broad sweeping language was evidence that the legislature had not specifically authorized an invasion on property rights.354 Kent arrived at this conclusion despite such an application being within the most natural reading of
the broad statute.355 The Vermont case of Starr v. Robinson provides another
example in which the “very broad expression” of the statute, if read literally,
would have been unconstitutional.356 As a result, the court explained that
the statute’s language “could not be permitted to operate,” or else the judiciary would have had to declare the law “null and void.”357 This and other
cases discussed above in Part II provide examples where generally applicable
laws were subject to judicial scrutiny, and legislatures were not simply given a
pass to accomplish with overly broad language what they were prohibited
from doing with targeted and discriminatory language.
And indeed, the Phillips and Cronin cases reflect this understanding that
generally applicable laws merited scrutiny where their application resulted in
consequences that religious groups experience as persecution. The Phillips
and Cronin courts both began by noting they were dealing with a generally
applicable rule that nevertheless operated to exert pressure on religious individuals that they experienced as religious persecution.
The Phillips court noted, “It is a general rule, that every man when legally
called upon to testify as a witness, must relate all he knows. This is essential
to the administration of civil and criminal justice.”358 The Phillips court then
noted the significant burden the government’s rule would place on the
priest’s ability to exercise his religion. Requiring the priest to testify would
place him “between Scylla and Charybdis” where the priest must “either violate his oath, or proclaim his infamy in the face of day” and be subject to
352 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *61.
353 2 WILSON, supra note 25, at 260.
354 Belknap v. Belknap, 2 Johns. Ch. 463, 470 (N.Y. Ch. 1817).
355 Id. at 472 (“Can we suppose that this act intended that these inspectors should carry
their ditches where they pleased, without any regard to the improvements of others? I am
entirely persuaded, that the project of draining this little lake, and thereby destroying one
mill, and affecting, more or less, all the others which are supplied by its waters, is a stretch
of power never within the contemplation of the act. It would be an unreasonable and
dangerous construction. The power given was supposed to be harmless. It was never
intended to touch and materially injure valuable improvements on adjoining lands; much
less was it intended to break up useful ancient streams, and the natural and capacious
reservoirs which fed them.”).
356 Starr v. Robinson, 1 D. Chip. 257, 260 (Vt. 1814).
357 Id. at 261.
358 SAMPSON, supra note 39, at 97 (emphasis added).
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“degradation” as a consequence of committing the crime of not testifying.359
Similarly, in Cronin the court observed that the priest would be forced to
choose to “either violate the oath administered to him by giving false testimony, or by disclosing what he has received in the confessional, violate the
ecclesiastic oath administered at the time of his ordination,” or by “silence”
find himself in the “contempt” of the court.360 The priest would thus be
“pressed by the whole weight of the penal branch of the law, and be prohibited from the exercise of this essential and indispensable part of [his] religion in confessing all such misdeeds.”361 To the priest, the court noted, this
“would be little short of persecution.”362
The Cronin court determined that “the great constitutional boon of
religious toleration, which secures to all the ‘free exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience,’ cannot be enjoyed by this class of our people” if they had no right to an exemption.363 Thus, an equitable
modification to the general rule was necessary to avoid “persecution” of this
class of religious individuals and make sure that “all men shall be free” to
practice their religion on equal footing without consequences that would
“affect, diminish, or enlarge their civil capacities.”364 In other words, religious groups could experience persecution just as acutely whether from
targeted legislation or generally applicable legislation that simply disregarded their religious needs.
Along these lines, the Phillips court also observed that governments
throughout time had violated important fundamental rights regarding religious freedom in “a history of oppression and tyranny over the consciences of
men.”365 Indeed, the court acknowledged that the early American colonies
themselves had been “infected with . . . narrow views, and bigoted feelings”
against religious minorities.366 The court described its state constitutional
guarantee of religious liberty as a “monument of . . . wisdom” and “liberality,”367 operating as a “preventative” meant to safeguard against the history
of such “calamities, that have deluged the world with tears and with
359 Id. at 99. In other words, if forced to testify, “he violates his ecclesiastical oath—If
he prevaricates he violates his judicial oath—Whether he lies, or whether he testifies the
truth he is wicked, and it is impossible for him to act without acting against the laws of
rectitude and the light of conscience.” Id. at 103.
360 Commonwealth v. Cronin, 1 Q.L.J. 128, 139 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1856).
361 Id. at 138–39.
362 Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
363 Id. at 142.
364 Id. at 137.
365 SAMPSON, supra note 39, at 109.
366 Id. at 110.
367 Id. at 110. New York’s constitution specifically provided as follows:
[T]hat the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed, within this
state, to all mankind: Provided, That the liberty of conscience, hereby granted,
shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices
inconsistent with the peace or safety of this State.
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blood.”368 In other words, religious exemptions were necessary to avoid
blood, tears, and calamities of historical persecution that could be accomplished just as effectively indirectly through general legislation as it could
with targeted legislation.
In response to arguments by the government, both the Phillips and
Cronin courts rejected the idea that a religious exemption would give the
religious individual unfair treatment or an unjust privilege. The Cronin court
acknowledged the government’s argument that “this exemption of Catholic
clergymen would be extending to them a privilege not enjoyed by clergymen
of the protestant persuasion.”369 But the court responded by observing that
“[n]o Protestant claims any such exemption, and they cannot be said to be
denied that which they lay no claim to.”370 The court also explained that if a
“rule of evidence, or any other principle of law, shall deprive Protestants of
one of the sacraments of their Church, and thus deny to them the ‘free exercise of their religion according to the dictates of conscience,’ ” such Protestants “should be held exempt from the operation of any such rule, or
principle of law.”371 In that respect, religious exemptions from generally
applicable laws did not create a privilege for one religious group. It put them
on the same playing field as other religious groups by removing the application of a law that was leading to consequences the religious believers experienced as persecution.372
This historical perspective tracks the approach the Court employed in
modern First Amendment jurisprudence that predated Smith. Specifically,
the Court explained that “equality in treatment [did] not save [a generally
applicable] ordinance,” because “[f]reedom of press, freedom of speech,
[and] freedom of religion are in a preferred position.”373
3. Exemptions Were a Means of Protecting Rule-of-Law Norms, Not
Courting Anarchy
Justice Scalia argued that any society adopting a system of religious
exemptions would undermine rule-of-law norms to the extent that it was
“courting anarchy.”374 Similarly, Vincent Phillip Muñoz argued that “if
exemptions are constantly and continually necessary to protect such a fundamental right, something has gone drastically wrong with our system of
5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 2637 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., Gov’t Printing Off. 1909) (1906).
368 SAMPSON, supra note 39, at 109.
369 Commonwealth v. Cronin, 1 Q.L.J. 128, 140 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1856).
370 Id.
371 Id.
372 Indeed, the court criticized the government’s argument about privilege as “rather
more popular than logical,” and thought the argument “may be invoked to excite
prejudice,” it “should never be allowed to disturb” the court’s judgment. Id. at 140–41.
373 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
374 Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).
OF THE
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law.”375 This argument depends on the premise that the rule of law is
embodied in statutes and judicial protection of constitutional rights is not
included in a rule-of-law norm. But as Kent noted long ago, “if the law be in
opposition to the Constitution, and both apply to a particular case, the court
must either decide the case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution, or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law.”376 Kent
asked, “how can [courts] close their eyes on the Constitution, and see only
the law?”377
If there was a conflict between a constitutional protection and a statute,
historically courts provided equitable exemptions to statutes precisely because
they understood that remedy to be much more respectful of the legislature
than simply declaring a law void. For example, Justice Samuel Nelson
observed that courts should construe statutes “in connection with the provision of the constitution.”378 Judge Tilghman from Pennsylvania explained
that “it must be acknowledged, that general expressions are sometimes to be modified” when they conflict with other fundamental law.379 In the 1808 Baxter
case, the court noted that if it didn’t read an exception into the statute, it
would be required to declare the statute “unconstitutional.”380 And Justice
Story noted the importance of equitable modifications so as to avoid assuming that “the Legislature would voluntarily transcend its constitutional
authority.”381 As discussed above, equity provided an important method for
the judiciary to put a constitutional check on legislatures without using the
more politically charged judicial remedy of declaring a law void.382
Interestingly, this rule-of-law preference for exemptions continues today.
As Justice O’Connor put it for a unanimous Court, whereas facial challenges
result in “invalidat[ing] the law wholesale,” carving back just certain applications of statutes is a more “modest remedy” that allows the judiciary to “try
not to nullify more of a legislature’s work than is necessary.”383 Or as Justice
Stevens put it, when the Court strikes down statutes facially, rather than to
certain applications, “[t]he Court operates with a sledge hammer rather than
a scalpel.”384 Notably Justice Scalia has also repeatedly written in favor of the
375 Muñoz, supra note 347.
376 1 KENT, supra note 126, at *453.
377 Id.
378 Prentiss v. Brennan, 19 F. Cas. 1278, 1279 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1851); WHITTINGTON, supra
note 92, at 75.
379 Waln v. Shearman, 8 Serg. & Rawle 357, 360 (Pa. 1822) (emphasis added).
380 Baxter v. Taber, 4 Mass. (4 Tyng) 361, 365 (1808) (“To give a power of this extent to
the sessions, could not have been within the intent of the statute: and if the legislature had
intended it, it is manifest that the execution of the power would have been unconstitutional, as it would have been an appropriation of private property to public uses without
compensation to the proprietors.”).
381 United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
382 See supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text.
383 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329, 331 (2006).
384 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 399 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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“usual rule” that facial invalidation is an exceptional judicial remedy, whereas
as-applied invalidation is the norm.385
* * *
Admittedly, the fact that Smith relies on assumptions without basis in
history does not go the full distance of establishing that religious exemptions
are supported by history. A full treatment of all the relevant historical evidence is beyond the scope of this Article. But understanding the role equitable interpretation plays in judicial exemptions provides one additional
important implication supporting a modern religious exemption regime, discussed below.
B. The Mode of Analysis Courts Used to Create Equitable Exemptions Has Some
Resemblance to Modern Strict Scrutiny Analysis
Hamburger has argued that “it is improbable that the framers and
ratifiers of the Bill of Rights deliberately adopted a balancing test as the standard of individual religious liberty and federal power when these were in
conflict.”386 Bradley argues that the “narrowly tailored means” to achieve a
“compelling [government] interest” test had no basis in the law prior to the
Court’s 1963 decision in Sherbert.387 And Scalia spared no indignation in
Smith when he said, “[I]t is horrible to contemplate that federal judges will
regularly balance against the importance of general laws the significance of
religious practice.”388 Scalia also asserted, “[N]o one . . . contends that” the
compelling interest test “conforms” to early historical evidence of religious
liberty.389
On the other hand, both Laycock and McConnell argue that early state
constitutional protections of religious liberty were roughly the eighteenthcentury versions of what judges today would do under a compelling-interest
test.390 Early state constitutional provisions protecting religious liberty frequently contained provisos to “protect public peace and safety.”391 Laycock
385 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 77–78, 83 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
also Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174, 1176–1181 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Ada v. Guam Soc’y of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011, 1011–13 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
386 Hamburger, supra note 5, at 931.
387 Bradley, supra note 15, at 247.
388 Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889–90 n.5 (1990).
389 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 540 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
390 See Laycock, supra note 14, at 102–03 (1990) (“[P]eace and safety in their language,
compelling interest in ours.”); Michael McConnell, Should Congress Pass Legislation Restoring
the Broader Interpretation of Free Exercise of Religion?, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 181, 185–86
(1992) (“This formulation was a precursor to the compelling-interest test . . . .”).
391 McConnell, supra note 11, at 1464.
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and McConnell argue that this is evidence of the sorts of government interests that would be necessary to lawfully burden religious exercise.392
Looking at this question with the tradition of equitable interpretation in
mind provides additional historical support for some aspects of the strict
scrutiny analysis courts engage in under a modern exemption regime. Specifically, the mischief rule was a form of equitable interpretation that likely
could have led to judicial protections for religious objectors. This rule
looked carefully at the problem the legislature was trying to solve when it
crafted a law, and then whether application of the law to the particular facts
before it would actually advance resolution of that mischief.393 Where such
an application would not actually help address the mischief that gave rise to
the law, equitable interpretation norms suggested that an exemption should
be provided. As Justice Story explained, “where a statute ‘is susceptible of
two interpretations, one of which satisfies the terms, and stops at the obvious
mischief provided against, and the other goes to an extent, which may
involve innocent parties in its penalties, it is the duty of the court to adopt the
former.’ ”394
This mischief analysis has some resemblance to modern strict scrutiny
analysis. Under the modern test, a court considers what “government interest” is animating enforcement of the law. This question is similar to asking
what “mischief” animated historical statutes. Then under a less restrictive
alternative analysis, one asks, at least in part, whether applying the law at
issue to the religious objector actually advances the government’s interest, or
whether there are better ways to advance that interest.395 This question is
similar to asking whether the application of a law to a specific set of facts
would actually meaningfully address the mischief the legislature was trying to
ameliorate.
For example, let us consider the famous surgeon exemption case Blackstone relies on. There, the law at issue stated, “whoever drew blood in the
streets should be punished with the utmost severity.”396 But the mischief
motivating this law was most likely the desire to prevent violent and harmful
drawing of blood. When Blackstone asks whether the law could punish a
surgeon “who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street with a
fit,” the answer is clearly no under the mischief rule.397 Nothing about a
392 Laycock, supra note 14, at 103; McConnell, supra note 391, at 181.
393 See generally Bray, supra note 136.
394 Id. at 37 (emphasis added) (quoting Prescott v. Nevers, 19 F. Cas. 1286, 1288–89
(C.C.D. Me. 1827)).
395 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431
(2006) (stating that the compelling interest standard requires courts to “look[ ] beyond
broadly formulated interests” and instead “scrutinize[ ] the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants”); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 535 (1990) (stating that strict scrutiny requires
the government to prove its interest is “compelling” and its law is “narrowly tailored to
advance that interest”).
396 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *60.
397 Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-1\NDL102.txt

unknown

Seq: 61

5-NOV-20

8:12

2020]t h e h i s t o r i c a l o r i g i n s o f j u d i c i a l r e l i g i o u s e x e m p t i o n s115

surgeon opening a vein to help someone with an immediate health issue is
actually helping solve the problem the legislature was ostensibly focused
on—preventing violent bloodshed.398
Similarly, applying the mischief rule analysis to conflicts of conscience
would likely have led courts to determine that religious objectors often fell
outside of the mischief the law was really aimed at solving. Indeed, the courts
in both Phillips and Cronin employed this sort of analysis when determining
that a religious exemption was warranted for the Catholic priests in those
cases.
For example, in considering the mischief at issue with applying a subpoena rule to force a Catholic priest to divulge a confidential confessional,
the Phillips court exhibited skepticism of the government’s claimed interest
in public safety as applied to the case at hand. In response to the government’s attempt to rely on hypothetical concerns or slippery slope arguments,
the court stated, “The doctrine contended for, by putting hypothetical cases,
in which the concealment of a crime communicated in penance, might have
a pernicious effect, is founded on false reasoning.”399 The court went on,
“To attempt to establish a general rule, or to lay down a general proposition
from accidental circumstances, which occur but rarely, or from extreme
cases, . . . is totally repugnant to the rules of logic and the maxims of law.”400
The court emphasized that the “question is not” whether hypothetically the
religious exercise could lead to a “public injury,” but whether the government had shown that the specific religious exercise at issue had the “natural
tendency . . . to produce practices inconsistent with the public safety or tranquility.”401 It would be “stretching [the constitution] on the rack” to say that
the religious exercise here really threatened public safety or tranquility, the
court concluded.402 To hold otherwise “would be to mock the understanding, and to render the liberty of conscience a mere illusion.”403
In a similar way, the Cronin court did not simply accept the government’s claimed interest in “promoting the ends of criminal justice.”404 The
court noted that “whilst cases may be supposed in which the concealment of
a fact communicated in penance might have a pernicious effect, yet such
instances are rare, and furnish no foundation for the rule that they should be
required to disclose in all cases.”405 The court continued, “It has been truly
said, that ‘to attempt to establish a general rule, or to lay down a general
proposition from accidental circumstances, which occur but rarely, or from
398 See id. at *46–47.
399 SAMPSON, supra note 39, at 112.
400 Id.
401 Id. at 112–13.
402 Id. at 113.
403 Id. at 113 (“It would be to destroy the enacting clause of the proviso—and to render
the exception broader than the rule, to subvert all the principles of sound
reasoning . . . .”).
404 Commonwealth v. Cronin, 1 Q.L.J. 128, 140 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1856).
405 Id.
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extreme cases, which may sometimes happen in the infinite variety of human
actions, is totally repugnant to the rules of logic and the maxims of the
law.’ ”406 Thus,
[t]he question is not whether penance may sometimes communicate the
existence of an offence to a priest, which he is bound by his religion to
conceal, and the concealment of which may be a public injury, but whether
the natural tendency of it is to produce practices inconsistent with the public
safety.407

And the government had to “clearly” show this religious practice would be
“inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state.”408
Likewise, the Cronin court pointed out ways in which the government
would be failing to advance its own interest if it refused a religious exemption. Criminals would stop confessing to priests if they knew the information
could not be kept confidential, and thus the rule would “destroy the source
itself” and “the rule would defeat itself.”409
The Phillips court also spent time discussing existing secular exemptions
to the general rule. These included exceptions for husband and wife, attorney-client privilege, answers that would result in self-incrimination, or
answers that would disgrace or degrade him by “affect[ing] the purity of his
character.”410 The court noted that the similarity of the way in which these
exemptions undercut the general rule meant they had a “very intimate connexion with the point in question.”411 This analysis is not unlike the sorts of
tailoring analysis courts engage in now, when they note secular contexts in
which the government is undercutting its own claimed interest.412 In other
words, where the law had already excluded some scenarios from its application, use of mischief-rule-like analysis justified extending an exemption to a
similarly situated religious individual.
On the other hand, denying a religious exemption would be justified
under this sort of analysis where doing so would meaningfully advance the
government’s ability to address the mischief at issue. The government attorney in Permoli reflected this understanding regarding a potential religious
exemption from an ordinance preventing dead persons from being
exposed.413 The attorney argued that “law of necessity” would justify applying the ordinance in an evenhanded way even against religious individuals
who desired to perform religious rites in order to prevent the spread of “yel406 Id.
407 Id. (emphasis added).
408 SAMPSON, supra note 39, at 112.
409 Cronin, 1 Q.L.J. at 140.
410 SAMPSON, supra note 39, at 98–99.
411 Id. at 102.
412 See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 367 (2015) (“Although the Department
denied petitioner’s request to grow a 1/2-inch [religious] beard, it permits prisoners with a
dermatological condition to grow 1/4-inch beards. The Department does this even though
both beards pose similar risks.”).
413 Permoli v. Mun. No. 1 of New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 600 (1845).
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low fever.”414 The attorney noted that exemptions would undermine the
“strong sanitory measures [that] are deemed indispensable . . . to check the
range and prevalence of the pestilence when it comes” in “epidemic
form.”415 One could imagine similar reasoning being used today under strict
scrutiny analysis by courts who would deny a religious exemption to groups
refusing to comply with government orders to avoid large gatherings during
a pandemic.416
Thus, viewing religious exemptions in the context of equitable interpretation origins provides at least some historical support for judicial scrutiny
that courts apply when exempting some religious behavior that does not
seem to have any actual relationship to the “mischief,” or government interest, or the law the government is seeking to enforce. The comparison to
strict scrutiny is strengthened if one believes, as Laycock and McConnell have
argued, that early state free exercise provisions suggest an understanding that
only certain types of government interests were sufficient to impinge on religious exercise.417 These interests included things like protecting public
health and safety. If the government may only pursue certain strong interests
to infringe on religious exercise, and under mischief rule analysis courts
would look closely at whether the particular application of a law actually
advances that interest, this begins to resemble modern strict scrutiny in many
important respects. This historical practice might also provide additional
explanation for why McConnell thought there was “strong[ ]” evidence of a
widespread practice of lower courts offering religious exemptions in their
discretion even in states like Pennsylvania and South Carolina where the
appellate courts had rejected mandatory religious exemptions.418
414 Id. at 600–01.
415 Id. at 600.
416 See, e.g., Haley Hinds, Tampa Megachurch Pastor Arrested After Leading Packed Services
Despite ‘Safer-at-Home’ Orders, FOX13NEWS (March 30, 2020), https://www.fox13news.com/
news/tampa-megachurch-pastor-arrested-after-leading-packed-services-despite-safer-athome-orders; Daniel Silliman, A Few Churches Are Defying Bans on Large Gatherings. That
Could be Bad for Religious Liberty., CHRISTIANITY TODAY (April 7, 2020), https://www.christian
itytoday.com/news/2020/april/churches-defy-coronavirus-religious-liberty.html. On the
other hand, this sort of analysis might be used to conclude that religious gatherings during
a pandemic are not problematic if parishioners stayed in their car during a drive-in worship service, and if drive through restaurants and liquor stores remain open. On Fire
Christian Center, Inc., v. Fischer, No. 3:20-CV-264, 2020 WL 1820249, at *7 (W.D. Ky. April
11, 2020) (“Louisville’s actions are also overbroad because, at least in this early stage of the
litigation, it appears likely that Louisville’s interest in preventing churchgoers from spreading COVID-19 would be achieved by allowing churchgoers to congregate in their cars as
On Fire proposes. On Fire has committed to practicing social distancing in accordance
with CDC guidelines. ‘Cars will park six feet apart and all congregants will remain in their
cars with windows no more than half open for the entirety of the service.’ Its pastor and a
videographer will be the only people outside cars, and they will be at a distance from the
cars.” (footnotes omitted)).
417 Laycock, supra note 14, at 103; McConnell, supra note 391, at 186.
418 See McConnell, supra note 11 at 1511 (citing Commonwealth v. Lesher, 17 Serg. &
Rawle 155, 155 (Pa. 1828)) (noting the dispute arose because a lower court judge excused
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IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS
Given the judiciary’s common use of equity to create exemptions from
statutes, viewing religious exemptions through this broader historical context
suggests that religious exemptions would not have been anomalous, and generally applicable laws were not immune from judicial scrutiny. That said,
there are counterarguments that may limit the force of the historical significance of equity in the context of religious exercise.
A. Are Equitable Exemptions Really a Historical Analog for Modern Exemptions?
Modern constitutional exemptions across a range of different types of
constitutional rights now have a name and can be easily identified: constitutional as-applied challenges.419 By contrast, the background principles
regarding equity of the statute were not grouped together in the separate
doctrinal categories that they are today. Indeed, equity of the statute also
resembles other modern doctrines like the canon of constitutional avoidance
and the rule of lenity.420 One could posit that equitable interpretation is a
common ancestor for multiple modern constitutional doctrines. So is it fair
to point to equitable exemptions as an early analog of as-applied challenges?
Admittedly, there are differences between early judicial practice and
modern as-applied challenges—particularly rhetorical ones. Founding-era
courts did not always speak explicitly in terms of a valid statute applying to a
factual scenario but for a constitutional conflict that requires an exemption.
Frequently courts spoke about the legislature not intending a law to apply
broadly to certain circumstances, or in terms of “construing” a law to avoid
certain problematic outcomes.421
But there are a number of reasons why these distinctions do not undercut the idea that equitable interpretation provides a historical analog for
modern exemptions.
First, as a practical matter, it likely would not matter much to religious
adherents whether you told them the court was “exempting” their religious
a juror from a case who had “conscientious scruples on the subject of capital punishment”
and that the evidence “strongly suggests that the actual practice favored exemptions, even
though the appellate decisions” in these states “went the other way” (quoting Lesher, 17
Serg. & Rawle at 155)); see also State v. Willson, 13 S.C.L. (2 McCord) 393, 395–96 (Const.
Ct. 1823) (“There is set forth among the causes shown, a notice of certain instances of
individuals being excused, as well as an appeal to good feelings, plainly interwoven in the
brief. And no doubt, instances have occurred, and will again occur, where the parties
attended at the time required by law, but there being superfluous jurors, were readily
excused.”).
419 Barclay & Rienzi, supra note 270, at 1596.
420 Manning, supra note 20, at 96, 119–20. One could also analogize to the canon
construing statutes narrowly in derogation of the common law. MAXWELL, supra note 134,
at 254–57 (“Lord Nottingham said that all Acts which restrain the common law, that is,
apparently, which impose restrictions unknown to the common law, ought themselves to
be restrained in exposition.”).
421 See supra Section II.D.
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conduct from a statute, or “interpreted” a statute in an aggressive way to
avoid a conflict with free exercise. Either result would provide more protection under the current Smith regime. And indeed, many early ministerial
exception cases providing protection to religious adherents did so under a
very strong form of constitutional avoidance.422
Second, modern constitutional doctrines likely never perfectly mirror
historical practice, and it might be foolish to assume that they would. And it
is worth remembering that while our modern constitutional doctrines draw
clean lines between doctrines like constitutional avoidance and as-applied
challenges, the Founding generation did not.
More important is that modern as-applied challenges mirror basic
impulses of the historical actors in new doctrinal forms. Indeed, any differences do not detract from the more basic similarity, which is that in both the
historical examples and modern as-applied challenges, the outcome was that
a court refused to apply the words of a statute as broadly as the plain language could reasonably allow. And the court refused to do so because of
external values that placed limitations on such an application.
For modern purposes, the most relevant external value is a constitutional one. In both instances, this decision by a court to read a statute more
narrowly than the language could support acts as a sort of safety valve,
allowing statutes to generally stay in place while preventing discrete applications from operating in constitutionally problematic ways. As Plucknett
described equitable interpretation in a chapter entitled “Exceptions Out of
the Statute,” historically a “court restrict[ed] the scope of a statute by excepting particular cases from its operation although the statute itself contains
little or nothing to warrant such a procedure.”423
Whittington has observed a few of these similarities between early equitable cases and modern as-applied challenges. He argued that some of the
early equitable exemption cases involved the judiciary “announc[ing] that
the proposed application of the law exceeds the power of Congress and that
such application will be regarded as off-limits and not judicially enforceable.”424 This statutory interpretation strategy allowed courts historically to
“maintain that the legislature has not ‘voluntarily transcend[ed] its constitutional authority’ even as judges enforce constitutional limitations against the
422 See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979). Many ministerial
exception cases prior to Hosanna-Tabor were also constitutional avoidance cases, including
some of the earliest articulations of this doctrine. See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d
294 (3d Cir. 2006); Bollard v. Ca. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 211 F.3d 1331 (9th Cir.
2000); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560–61 (5th Cir. 1972) (“‘If a serious
doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be
avoided.’ We therefore hold that Congress did not intend, through the nonspecific wording of the applicable provisions of Title VII, to regulate the employment relationship
between church and minister.” (quoting Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 279 U.S. 288,
348 (1936))).
423 PLUCKNETT, supra note 132, at 57.
424 WHITTINGTON, supra note 92, at 23.
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legislature and refuse to apply laws on constitutional grounds in the cases
before them.”425 Without formally voiding statutes, this approach still “has
an equivalent effect of signaling to litigants that the courts will engage in
constitutional interpretation and free parties from the immediate burdens of
statutes that cannot be constitutionally justified.”426 Whittington noted that
“[w]e seriously misunderstand how courts have exercised the power of judicial review if we overlook” these early examples of laws being found “unconstitutional as applied.”427 On the other hand, perhaps the argument that
judicially created exemptions have no basis in history proves too much, as it
could place in question the entire modern practice of as-applied constitutional adjudication.428
B. What About the “Congress Shall Make No Law” Text of the First Amendment?
Bradley agrees with Scalia and Hamburger that the “Congress shall make
no law” text of the Free Exercise Clause meant that “a class of legislation is
forbidden” to Congress—specifically legislation aimed at specific religious
belief or conduct.429 Bradley argues that this was the historical understanding of the Free Exercise Clause.430 Hamburger similarly argues that the Free
Exercise Clause was meant to prohibit Congress from legislating in ways that
were discriminatory to religion.431 Perhaps putting it most pointedly,
Nicholas Rosenkranz argued that if the religious exercise is burdened by an
executive official merely applying a neutral and generally applicable law that
Congress did not aim at religion, then the First Amendment has nothing to
say about that and would allow no as-applied challenges to statutes.432
This textual interpretation, however, overlooks the historical context in
which equitable exemptions arose and evolved. Specifically, when courts cre425 Id. at 24 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745,
750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750)).
426 Id.
427 Id.
428 See Barclay & Rienzi, supra note 270, at 1595 (analyzing how a religious exemption is
simply one type of an as-applied challenge).
429 See Bradley, supra note 15, at 306.
430 Id. Nicholas Rosenkranz has similarly argued that the “Congress shall make no law”
constitutional text makes clear that judicially created religious exemptions are unjustifiable. Specifically, Rosenkranz argues that the First Amendment operates explicitly as a
prohibition against Congress. Rosenkranz, supra note 296, at 1266. Thus, Rosenkranz
argues that “[t]here can be no ‘as-applied’ challenge under the Free Exercise Clause,
because application of the statute occurs long after the alleged constitutional violation is
complete.” Id. (emphasis omitted). In other words, if the religious exercise is burdened
by an executive official merely applying a neutral and generally applicable law that Congress did not aim at religion, then the First Amendment has nothing to say about that. The
amendment is aimed at Congress and not executive action. Thus, “a challenge under the
Free Exercise Clause should always be ‘facial,’ not ‘as-applied.’” Id. at 1268 (emphasis
omitted).
431 See Hamburger, supra note 5, at 938.
432 Rosenkranz, supra note 296, at 1266.
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ated equitable exemptions to statutes, the focus of the inquiry was often on
the legislature and not on the executive officials. As discussed in Section II.D
above, courts employed a legal fiction of presuming that the legislature
would not have intended the broad sweep of legislation to include unconstitutional outcomes. Courts would even interpret general and broad laws as
evidence that legislatures did not intend them to be applied to constitutionally problematic circumstances.433 Thus, the judiciary would interpret laws
equitably to comply with higher laws unless it was clear that Congress had
interpreted the opposite result. And if Congress had clearly crafted a law
aimed at such a result, the court may be forced to declare the statute altogether void, or repugnant to the Constitution.434
For example, in Starr v. Robinson, the court was concerned about the
legislature interfering with freedom of contract by discharging a bond that
had already been assigned to a third-party creditor.435 The court observed
that the legislature could not have “clearly expressed” an intent to interfere
with such a bond, because if it had the law “would have been a palpable
violation of the constitution of the United States.”436 The court would thus
be required to declare the law “null and void.”437 However, the legislature
was also prohibited from accomplishing this same result simply by virtue of
drafting a law with very “broad expression” that indirectly swept in such an
application.438 In this latter case, the court equitably modified the statute to
disallow this application to a bond assigned to a third party, and in so doing
avoided the constitutional conflict.439 In other words, equitable interpretation prevented the legislature from authorizing indirectly what it could not
authorize expressly.
The First Amendment’s focus on “Congress” fits with the method Justice
Story described in which courts equitably modified statutes to avoid “declaring the solemn act of the Legislature to be void.”440 Relying on the legal
fiction of the legislature’s intent, Justice Marshall explained that courts
would “struggle hard against a construction which will . . . affect the rights of
433 See supra Section III.B.
434 United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 358, 389–90 (1805) (“That the consequences are to be considered in expounding laws, where the intent is doubtful, is a principle not to be controverted; but it is also true that it is a principle which must be applied
with caution, and which has a degree of influence dependent on the nature of the case to
which it is applied. Where rights are infringed, where fundamental principles are overthrown, where the general system of the laws is departed from, the legislative intention
must be expressed with irresistible clearness to induce a court of justice to suppose a
design to effect such objects.”).
435 Starr v. Robinson, 1 D. Chip. 257, 259 (Vt. 1814).
436 Id. at 261.
437 Id.
438 Id. at 260.
439 Id. at 261.
440 United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
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parties.”441 Further research is warranted to assess whether constitutional
Framers discussed the Free Exercise Clause in this equitable context.442
As described above in Section II.E, this tradition of reliance on legislative intent originated in England, where Parliament was sovereign and courts
did not have authority to strike down discrete applications of laws. Thus,
courts’ ability to bend or modify laws only came by asserting that judges were
simply fulfilling Parliament’s true wishes. As Plowden explained, whenever
you read the text of statutes, imagine that the lawmaker is present, and ask
about the equitable question at hand, then give yourself that answer which
you imagine the lawmaker would have given.443 In America, where legislatures were not sovereign and were subject to real external constitutional limits enforced by courts, this legal fiction was not necessary in the same way to
authorize courts to ignore certain applications of statutes.444 Eventually this
legislative intent rhetoric fell out of much of our constitutional adjudication,
but its historical use is important to understand the “Congress shall make no
law” relationship to judicial exemptions from statutes.
C. How Does Equitable Interpretation Interact with Establishment
Clause Considerations?
If equitable exemptions provide historical support for religious exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause, one fair question that merits attention
is what the implications of this historical evidence might be for the Establishment Clause. Comprehensive treatment of this important question is beyond
the purview of this Article, but a few preliminary considerations are worth
noting.
First, equitable interpretation involves molding statutes to conform with
some kind of external value or norm. So part of the answer to the question
will depend on what standard or norm one understands the Establishment
441 See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801) (discussing
this issue in the context of retroactive application of a law).
442 For an instructive analysis of facial versus as applied challenges in the First Amendment context, see John Harrison, Power, Duty, and Facial Invalidity, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
501, 502–03 (2013) (“[T]he grants and limits of federal legislative power, like the Commerce Clause and the First Amendment, do not create duties at all. They grant and restrict
power and do nothing else. As a result, no argument about facial validity that rests on the
derivation of duties from such provisions can succeed. Legislators do have duties with
respect to the constitutionality of legislation, I will argue, but those duties arise from other
provisions of the Constitution and are qualified, not absolute. Because they are qualified,
they also do not support an inference that grants and restrictions of power operate at the
level of rules.”).
443 Eyston v. Studd (1574), 75 Eng. Rep. 688, 695, 699, 2 Plowden 459, 465, 468 (KB)
(Plowden’s note); BAKER, supra note 112, at 222.
444 An additional practical reason for relying on the intent of legislatures under early
English common law was that for centuries, statutes were not written down carefully or
kept in an accessible location. It was not until 1810–22 that an official version of the Statutes of the Realm was published, but even this volume was acknowledged to be incomplete.
BAKER, supra note 112, at 219.
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Clause to set forth. One aspect of the Establishment Clause widely agreed
upon by scholars, for example, is the idea that government cannot dictate to
a church who its leaders should be.445 And one can see that sort of external
norm at play in the 2012 case where the Supreme Court granted an exemption for the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to protect a religious
group’s ability to select its religious leader.446
Other justifications for molding or exempting certain applications of
statutes might vary depending on other substantive understandings of Establishment Clause protections. For example, professors such as Frederick
Gedicks, Micah Schwartzman, Nelson Tebbe, and Richard Schragger argue
that statutes such as RFRA must be read narrowly (or even read to provide an
exemption from normal operation of the statute) where their application
would operate to create certain types of harms for third parties.447 I have
elsewhere disputed that this is a correct doctrinal or historical understanding
of the Establishment Clause,448 along with numerous other scholars.449 But
if this understanding of the Establishment Clause were substantively correct,
445 See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, Church Autonomy in the Constitutional Order: The End of
Church and State?, 49 LA. L. REV. 1057, 1066 (1989); Patrick McKinley Brennan, Differentiating Church and State (Without Losing the Church), 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 29, 33 (2009); Carl
H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1583–84; Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious
Doctrine: What Are We Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 862 (2009); Douglas
Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations
and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1389 (1981); Paul Horwitz,
Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV.
79, 118–19 (2009); Witte, Jr., supra note 66, at 413.
446 Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 196 (2012).
447 See NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE 49–70 (2017); Nelson
Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman & Richard Schragger, How Much May Religious Accommodations
Burden Others?, in LAW, RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 215–39 (Holly Fernandez Lynch, I. Glenn Cohen & Elizabeth Sepper eds., 2017); Nelson Tebbe, Micah
Schwartzman & Richard Schragger, When Do Religious Accommodations Burden Others?, in
THE CONSCIENCE WARS: RETHINKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN RELIGION, IDENTITY, AND EQUALITY 328, 333 (Susanna Mancini & Michel Rosenfeld eds., 2018); Frederick Mark Gedicks &
Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional
Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 343, 361 (2014).
448 See Stephanie H. Barclay, First Amendment “Harms,” 95 IND. L.J. 331, 337–38 (2020).
449 See Thomas C. Berg, Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State, 38 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 103, 131 (2015); DeGirolami, supra note 4, at 13–32; Carl H. Esbeck, When Religious Exemptions Cause Third-Party Harms: Is the Establishment Clause Violated?, 59 J. CHURCH &
STATE 357, 369–70 (2016); Richard W. Garnett, Accommodation, Establishment, and Freedom of
Religion, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 39, 45–46 (2014); Christopher C. Lund, Religious Exemptions, Third-Party Harms, and the Establishment Clause, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1375, 1383–84
(2016); Mark Storslee, Religious Accommodation, the Establishment Clause, and Third-Party
Harm, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 931–32, 934–36 (2019); Marc O. DeGirolami, Holt v. Hobbs
and the Third-Party-Harm Establishment Clause Theory, MIRROR JUST. (Oct. 7, 2014), https://
mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2014/10/where-has-the-establishment-clausethird-party-harm-argument-gone.html.
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this judicial tradition of equitable interpretation would support the type of
statutory narrowing of RFRA for which these scholars advocate.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to the assertions of scholars, early religious exemptions cases
are not an outlier or an abrupt change in the law. They are simply another
instance of early judicial review and its connection to equitable interpretation of statutes. An understanding of wider judicial practices helps avoid the
trend of treating a judicial remedy for free exercise as an island in the law.
An understanding of this broader equitable context also has important
implications for evaluating whether assumptions the Court’s current
approach to religious exemptions finds support in the historical evidence. In
his well-known Smith decision, Scalia argued that religious exemptions would
be a “constitutional anomaly,” that neutral and generally applicable statutes
were entitled to deference rather than judicial scrutiny, and that providing
exemptions would undercut rule-of-law norms and create a system that was
“courting anarchy.” By broadening the historical lens to look at equitable
judicial review norms at the Founding period, this Article demonstrates that
equitable exemptions to statutes were a judicial norm, not an anomaly.
Broad, generally applicable laws were often treated with suspicion, not deference, when they butted up against rights or other constitutional norms. And
providing exemptions to laws was understood as more respectful to rule-oflaw norms than declaring a law void.
Understanding the role equitable interpretation plays in judicial exemptions provides additional important implications supporting an original
understanding in favor of religious exemptions. Specifically, the mischief
rule was a form of equitable interpretation that focused on the problem the
legislature was trying to solve when it crafted the law. Courts would exempt
applications of laws that did not actually help the government address the
mischief at issue. This sort of analysis is similar to that used by early antebellum courts providing religious exemptions, when they determined that
exempting religious objectors would not actually undercut government interests in peace and safety. Indeed, it is plausible that the mischief rule would
have frequently justified lower court decisions to decline to apply laws to
religious objectors. Notably, this mischief analysis is analogous to modern
strict scrutiny analysis, particularly the portion of the test that scrutinizes
whether application of a law actually advances the government’s interest.
Thus, contrary to the conventional view, judicially created religious
exemptions are well within our constitutional traditions of judicial review and
may in fact have more historical support than the Court’s current approach.

